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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters: One on international
finance and two on international economics.1
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 originated in the U.S. has brought to
surface the need for measuring and monitoring the transmission of extreme
downside market risk. The first chapter investigates the international risk
transmission mechanism between the U.S. and Asian major stock markets. By
applying two recently introduced test statistics based on cross-quantilogram
function, we first confirm the existence of risk spillover from the U.S. to Asian
major stock markets, as well as the reversed feedback effect. Furthermore, we
apply the multivariate quantile regression model (VAR for VaR) to quantita-
tively uncover these tail-interdependency patterns, showing how the extreme
downside risk transmits between the U.S. and Asian markets. Our results
suggest that these stock markets are highly integrated in terms of risk trans-
mission.
It is a stylized fact that growth shocks in major economies generate the
world business cycle, which is usually extracted from dynamic factor models.
In the second chapter, we utilize a trade-linked SVAR model with a realistic
1Chapter two and three are co-authored with my supervisor, Professor Tilak Abeysinghe.
vii
identification scheme to capture the transmission mechanism, covering 60 ma-
jor economies and the rest of the world. We show that the SVAR structure
provides a meaningful economic foundation to factor-model-based statistical
analyses. In addition, the SVAR model shows the important role played by
indirect multiplier channels in the transmission mechanism and how these ef-
fects change over time. Specific attention is paid to the transmission of the
US and China growth shocks.
Dramatic fluctuations in oil price from time to time demand more research
that can evaluate global effects of oil price shocks. Using a large scale structural
vector autoregression (SVAR) model that allows for an evolving parameter
structure and that covers 60 oil importing and exporting economies, the third
chapter disentangles the direct and indirect effects of oil price shocks on an
economy. The results based on change in oil price and oil price decomposed
into aggregate demand, oil specific demand and oil supply shocks show that in
addition to often measured direct impact, the indirect multiplier impact that
works through the international transmission mechanism plays a crucial role
in explaining the impact of oil price swings. The negative effects of a sharp
rise in oil price on oil importers are likely to be offset by the positive impact
on oil exporters. Nevertheless, oil exporters may also suffer in the long run.
viii
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of Stock Market Movements
1.1 Introduction
Measuring and monitoring the distributional interdependence between differ-
ent stock markets is a primary concern among academic researchers, policy
makers, and business practitioners. The Great Recession of 2007-2009 origi-
nated in the U.S. has further heightened the need for research that evaluate
transmission mechanism of extreme downside market risk. Given a rising
trend of global financial market integration, understanding the international
risk transmission mechanism not only helps to improve portfolio allocation
strategies in seeking the international investment opportunities, but also leads
to the best policy responses for maintaining financial stability and avoiding
financial contagion.
The relationship between national stock markets has been analyzed in a
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series of studies. One common feature of the existing literature is that they
focus on the market interdependency structure within the first and second
moments, and use volatility to measure risk (e.g. Eun and Shim, 1989; Engle
and Susmel, 1993; King and Wadhwani, 1990; King, Sentana and Wadhwani,
1994; Lin, Engle and Ito, 1994; Forbes, 2002; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009; Beirne
et al., 2010; Jayasuriya, 2011). Volatility describes the degree of variation of
financial series, and is an important measure in finance. However, regard-
ing the market risk, volatility can only capture a small fraction of extreme
downside market movements. Using volatility as the risk measure has at least
two major drawbacks: First, volatility treats the market gains and losses in a
symmetric way, but the market risk apparently only relates to the occurrence
of the left tail of the financial return distribution. Second, volatility fails to
capture the fat tail feature of financial series, which is a widely reported fact in
many empirical studies. In other words, even in the absence of the spillover in
the mean and volatility, one market can still affect other markets through the
interactions in the higher moments. As a result, instead of volatility, a more
sensible measure is needed to capture the market risk, and allows us to further
investigate the risk spillover across international equity markets. In the field of
banking and finance, the Value at Risk (VaR) concept, originally proposed by
J.P. Morgon in 1994, has become a standard measure of the downside market
2
risk today. The advantage of this measure is that it directly links the market
risk to the left quantile of the conditional return distribution. It has further
become an essential tool for market regulators to ensure financial stability and
conduct the macroprudential policies (e.g. the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision). To date, however, there is a shortage of in-depth analyses of the
interdependency structure of national stock markets examined by means of
VaR. The objective of this paper is to engage in a more comprehensive analy-
sis of international risk transmission mechanism, with a particular emphasis on
quantifying how the risk transmits between the U.S. and Asian major markets.
As is well known, the United States is the largest and most powerful econ-
omy in the world. With more than 10 thousand listed companies and $26.33
trillion market value, American stock market is also viewed as the most effi-
cient and most representative developed stock market in the world.1 The Asian
markets, on the other hand, especially the emerging markets, are the most vig-
orous economies and global growth engines in the recent years. Thanks to fast
growing status of these countries’ economies, their financial markets have also
experienced an astonishing development. For now, China and Japan are doc-
umented as the second and third largest market with respect to the market
1The market cap figures are reported by World Development Indicators, World Bank,
2014. The $26.33 trillion accounts for 36.51% world total market cap. The dollar refers to
the U.S. dollar.
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Figure 1.1: Daily Return of S&P 500 and Selected Asian Markets
Figure 1.1: Daily Return of Shanghai and S&P 500
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cap, with $6.00 and $4.38 trillion market value respectively. Therefore, they
have offered plenty of investment opportunities in the recent years. Besides,
these markets interact heavily with the U.S. market. Figure 1.1 plots the daily
return of the U.S. S&P Composite Index as well as two representative Asian
indices, Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index and Japan NIKKEI 225
Index. It can be clearly detected that the financial crisis initiated in the U.S.
housing market triggers stock market turmoil in the U.S. from 2007 to 2009. In
the same period, both China and Japan also suffer a substantial stock market
crash. Based on the facts listed above, understanding the risk spillover be-
tween the U.S. and Asian financial markets has important implications for the
academic researchers, policy makers, and business practitioners. This papers
aims to trace out the dynamic risk interdependency structure between the U.S.
and Asian markets. In particular, we address the following issues: Does the
U.S. stock market indeed influence Asian major markets in terms of extreme
downside risk? Is there any market whose movements are causally prior to the
U.S. market? What will happen quantitatively to the Asian stock markets if
there is a shock to the U.S. stock market? How to construct a multivariate
VaR measure for the Asian markets using the information in the U.S. mar-
ket? Does the risk interdependency structure change over time? Is there any
different response pattern between losses and gains given the external shocks?
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In attempting to answer the questions above, we first construct two re-
cently introduced test statistics, which are based on the cross-quantilogram
function, to investigate the existence of risk spillover. Hong, Liu and Wang
(2009) propose a class of kernel based tests to detect the extreme downside
risk spillover between financial markets. These statistics have a convenient
asymptotic standard normal distribution and can be used to check a large
number of lags, thus we can detect risk spillover that occurs with time lags or
that has weak spillover at each lag but carries over a very long distributional
lag. Han et al. (2016) further establish the asymptotic distribution of the
cross-quantilogram and the corresponding test statistics, where the consistent
confidence intervals are derived by the stationary bootstrap. This bootstrap
approach allows us to examine the micro-structure of quantile dependence be-
tween two series. In our study, we apply these two tests to detect extreme
downside risk spillover between world financial markets. The data for this
study consist of daily stock market index closing prices from the U.S. S&P
Composite Index (US) and ten major Asian stock indices: Shanghai Stock
Exchange Composite Index (CN), Hong Kong Hang Seng Index (HK), In-
dia SENSEX Index (IN), Japan NIKKEI 225 Index (JP), Korea Composite
Stock Price Index (KO), Russia MICEX Index (RU), Singapore FTSE Straits
Times Index (SG), Shenzhen Component Index (SZ), Taiwan Stock Exchange
6
Weighted Index (TW), and Australia ASX 100 Index (AU).2 The data sets are
spanning from January 3, 2000 to June 30, 2014.
After confirming the existence of the risk spillovers, we further apply a
bivariate vector autoregressive model (VAR) for Value at Risk (VaR) (White,
Kim and Manganelli, 2015) to quantitatively trace out the dynamic risk trans-
mission mechanism between the U.S. and Asian markets. The idea of VaR
naturally lends itself to the concept of quantile regression. Compared to the
more traditional method that models the whole multivariate distribution, the
quantile approach has at least three appealing features. First, it directly mod-
els the quantile and links it to the market risk. As a result, it avoids the
indirect risk measure based on estimating the time-varying first and second
moments. Second, the quantile regression is known to be robust to outliers,
which is particularly important for analyzing financial time series. Third, the
quantile regression is a semi-parametric approach and therefore imposes little
distributional assumption on the underlying data generating process (DGP).
The multivariate quantile regression framework of VAR for VaR model can be
regarded as a multivariate extension of univariate conditional autoregressive
value at risk (CAViaR) model of Engle and Manganelli (2004). This multivari-
ate method is especially useful to account for reverse causality, and investigate
2We categorize Australia and Russia as Asian markets because of the geographical reason.
Also, these markets are lack of study.
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the dynamic interdependency structure across world financial markets. Given
the fast growing status of the Asian financial markets and rising degree of
global financial integration, it turns out to be essential to capture the feed-
back effect from Asian markets to the U.S. in terms of risk transmission.
The empirical findings of our analysis are expected to shed new light on the
interdependency structure of national stock markets, in general, and interna-
tional risk transmission mechanism of stock market movements, in particular.
Our results first indicate that there exists the substantial risk spillover from
the U.S. to the Asian markets, as well as the reversed (feedback) effect. Af-
ter estimating the multivariate quantile regression model, we quantitatively
uncover the tail interdependency patterns between these markets. We show
that these markets are highly integrated in terms of risk transmission. The
pseudo impulse response functions suggest that the shocks in the U.S. market
substantially lower the VaR in the Asian markets, which stays in line with its
dominating power across the world stock markets. Besides, price falls in Asian
markets also have a significant predictive power for the risk in the U.S. mar-
ket. This indicates the fast-growing status of Asian financial markets. In this
study, we also construct a new multivariate VaR measure for Asian markets.
By investigating the time-varying patterns of risk interdependency structure,
we further show a rising trend of cross-country risk linkages over time. We also
8
documents a substantial asymmetric property in the international transmission
mechanism of stock market movements, cautioning the underlying weakness of
adopting the volatility to measure the market risk. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first paper provides a systematical analysis of international
risk transmission mechanism, with a special emphasis on quantifying how the
risk transmits between the U.S. and Asian major markets.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefs the method-
ology used for this study, and section 1.3 analyzes the data sets and the em-
pirical results. The last section concludes with implications drawn from our
findings to business practitioners, policy makers, academic researchers and
financial regulators.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Value at Risk
Given the rising need for monitoring and controlling the financial risk, risk
prediction plays essential roles in the field of banking and finance. The Value
at Risk (VaR) concept, originally proposed by J.P. Morgan in 1994, has become
a standard measure for the market downside risk. The VaR is defined as a
3There is only one working paper investigating the similar topic like us. Chulia´, Guille´n
and Uribe (2015) investigate risk spillovers with a focus on the Latin American and G7
markets. Our paper differs from their work by not only focusing on the different markets,
but also providing the comprehensive analysis on the feedback effect from other markets to
the U.S. This turns out to be essential to apply the VAR for VaR model.
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threshold of loss value, such that the losses will exceed this VaR threshold with
only a small target probability, α. In practice, α is commonly chosen to be
1%, 5% or 10%. Mathematically speaking, the VaR for period t of a portfolio
is the negative α-quantile of the conditional return distribution, which has the
following specification:
V aRαt ≡ −Qα(rt|Ft−1) = − inf
x
{x ∈ R : P(rt ≤ x|Ft−1) ≥ α}, 0 < α < 1,
(1.1)
where Qα denotes the quantile function, rt is the return on an asset or portflio
in period t, and Ft represents the past information available at date t.
Despite its conceptual simplicity, the VaR prediction is a very challenging
statistical problem. The difficulty mainly lies in how to find a suitable model
for the widely reported features of financial series, e.g., volatility clustering,
substantial kurtosis, and mild skewness of financial returns. The existing mod-
els for calculating VaR, which mainly differ in the way of estimating the em-
pirical distribution, can be classified as follows: historical simulation method,
fully parametric models, extreme value theory method and quantile-regression
method.4 In this study, we mainly employ the filtered historical simulation
(FHS) to measure univariate VaR. It is a combination of historical simulation
method and fully parametric models. We also utilize the quantile-regression
4An extensive review on these methods can be found in Kuester, Mittnik and Paolella
(2006).
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method as a robustness check for the risk spillover results (Engle and Man-
ganelli, 2004).
For implementing the FHS based VaR measure, we first apply the univari-
ate GARCH model proposed by Bollerslev (1986) to filter out the persistent
volatility clustering and serial dependence in each stock series. For example,
denoting rt as the daily return of stock index, the AR(m)-GARCH(1,1) model
can be defined as: 







ht = ω + α1hi,t−1 + β1ε2t−1
(1.2)
The error term ξt is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution (N(0, 1)).
Parameters in the above equation are estimated by Quasi-Maximum Like-
lihood (QML) method to obtain the consistent estimator in the absence of
normality of the conditional shocks.
For the FHS, the VaR estimate forecasts are then generated by computing
the VaR from paths simulated using draws from the filtered residuals. More
specifically, we first estimate the unconditional quantile functions by solving
the following minimization problems:




πα(ξt − v) (1.3)
where πα(u) ≡ u(α− 1[u < 0]). Then, the VaR estimate can be calculated by
substituting it into estimated GARCH model.
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The idea of VaR naturally lends itself to the concept of quantile regression.
Instead of modeling the whole distribution, the specified left quantile of time
series can be explicitly modeled using any relevant information. One appealing
feature of this method is that we don’t need to impose any distributional
assumptions on the return series. More specifically, conditional quantile of
a portfolio, Qα(rt|xt) = −V aRαt , can be modeled as some function of the
information xt ∈ Ft that is,
V aRαt ≡ −gα(xt; βα), (1.4)
where gα(xt; βα) and parameter vector βα explicitly depend on α. One natural
extension of the objective function for the general, possibly non-linear case of





α |rt + V aRαt |+
∑
rt<−V aRαt
(1− α) |rt + V aRαt |
 (1.5)
with, according to Equation (1.4), V aRαt = −g(xt; βα) or, in the linear case,
V aRαt ≡ x′tβα. Consistency and asymptotic normality of the nonlinear re-
gression quantiles for the time-series case are established in Engle and Man-
ganelli (2004). In particular, their CAViaR specifications includes V aRαt−1 as
an explanatory variable in xt, to adapt to serial dependence in the first two
moments. A function of rt is also included to link the conditional quantile to
return innovations. More specifically, the absolute value CAViaR specification
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can be written as:
V aRαt = β0 + β1V aR
α
t−1 + β2 |rt−1| . (1.6)
It utilizes the autoregression parameter, β1, to capture the response to
the pervious V aRαt−1, and introduces a direct response of the quantile to the
return process, treating the effect of extreme returns on V aRαt and volatility
symmetrically.
1.2.2 Test Statistics
To illustrate the test statistics for Granger causality in risk, we first introduce
the cross-quantilogram function. The cross-quantilogram function (Linton and
Whang, 2007; Hong, Liu and Wang, 2009; Han et al., 2016) is proposed to
measure the quantile dependence between two series.
After calculating the VaR estimate, we may define estimated quantile-hit
or quantile-exceedance process for each return series ri,t:
Zˆi,t ≡ 1(ri,t < −V aRi,t), i = 1, 2, ... (1.7)
where 1(.) denotes the indicator function taking the value one when its argu-
ment is true, and zero otherwise.
Then we can define our cross-quantilogram function between two series:
















(Zˆ1,t+j − αˆ1)(Zˆ2,t − αˆ2), J < 0,
(1.9)
where αˆi ≡ T−1ΣTt=1Zˆi,t and the denominator in Equation (1.8) is the corre-
sponding variance: Cˆi(0) = T
−1∑T
t=1(Zˆi,t − αˆi)2.5
Given a set of quantiles, the cross-quantilogram considers dependency in
terms of the direction of deviation from quantiles and thus measures the direc-
tional predictability from one series to another. This can be a useful descriptive
device. Hong, Liu and Wang (2009) first propose a kernel based test statistics





where k (.) is a weighting function and M is a positive integer (bandwidth).
Examples of k (.) includes the truncated, Bartlett, Daniell, Parzen, quadratic-
spectral (QS) and Tukey-Hanning kernels. In this paper, we employ the Daniell
kernel to investigate the empirical questions:
k (z) = sin(πz)/πz,−∞ < z < +∞ (1.11)




k2(j/M)ρˆ2(j)− C1T (M)}/(2D1T (M))1/2 (1.12)
5We use same notation α to represent the mean of quantile-hit process since it converges










(1− j/T ){1− (j + 1) /T}k4(j/M).
Under appropriate regularity conditions, it can be shown that under H0, Q1(M) →
N (0, 1) in distribution. In addition to Q1, test statistic for bidirectional hy-




k2(j/M)ρˆ(j)− C2T (M)}/{2D2T (M)}1/2, (1.13)




(1− |j| /T )k2(j/M),




(1− |j| /T )(1− (|j|+ 1)/T )k4(j/M).
It also converges to standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis and
it is a suitable statistic when there is no prior information about the direction
of causality. The proposed tests have convenient asymptotic standard normal
distribution under the null hypothesis of no Granger causality in risk. These
tests check a large number of lags but avoid suffering from severe loss of power
due to the loss of large number of degrees of freedom, by adopting a downward
weighting kernel function. This downward weighting is consistent with the
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stylized fact that today’s financial markets are more influenced by more recent
events than by remote past events, thus enhancing the power of the proposed
tests.
Han et al. (2016) also establish the asymptotic distribution of the cross-
quantilogram and the corresponding test statistics, where the consistent confi-
dence intervals are derived by the stationary bootstrap. This method allows us
to assess the micro-structure of quantile dependence patterns. In this study, we
apply both of these two newly introduced methods to detect extreme downside
risk spillover between financial markets.
1.2.3 VAR for VaR
After confirming the existence of risk spillover, we employ the VAR for VaR
model (White, Kim and Manganelli, 2015) to trace out the dynamic tail inter-
dependency structure between financial markets. The VAR for VaR framework
can be viewed as a vector autoregressive extension to the traditional quantile
models. This method allows us to go beyond the analysis of the univariate
quantiles, and directly investigate the risk transmission mechanism between
stock markets.
A bivariate version used in this study relates the conditional quantiles of
the two random variables according to a vector autoregresive (VAR) structure,
conditional on the past information set Ft−1, can be written as:
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q1t = c1 + a11 |r1t−1|+ a12 |r2t−1|+ b11q1t−1 + b12q2t−1 (1.14)
q2t = c2 + a21 |r1t−1|+ a22 |r2t−1|+ b21q1t−1 + b22q2t−1
where |r2t−1| and |r2t−1| represent the return series of the U.S. and corre-
sponding Asian markets, and q1t and q2t are the conditional quantiles. If
b12 = b21 = 0, the above model reduces to the CAViaR model of Engle and
Manganelli (2004). This bivariate quantile model in Equation (1.14) can be
expressed more compactly in matrix form as follows:
qt = c + A |rt−1|+ Bqt−1, (1.15)
any empirical evidence for non-zero off-diagonal terms in either A or B will
indicate the presence of tail-dependence between the two variables.
Once we construct the VAR for VaR model, we can further quantify the
impacts of the external shocks on the tail of stock returns by estimating the
pseudo impulse response functions (PIRFs). Pseudo impulse response func-
tions differ from traditional functions because it assumes the intervention δ
affects the observable return rt only at time t. At all other periods there is no
change in rt. In this way, the pseudo θth quantile impulse response function
for the ith return rit can be written as:
Δi,s(r˜it) = q˜i,t+s − qi,t+s, s = 1, 2, 3...T (1.16)
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where q˜i,t+s is the θth conditional quantile of the treated series r˜it, and qi,t+s is
θth conditional quantile of the counterfactual series rit. One advantage of this
setting of PIRFs is that they retain the traditional interpretation of IRFs, even
now we can assess the responses of different quantiles of the distribution. Based
on that, they allow us to directly model the tail interdependency structure
across the financial series, and further examine how the risk transmits from one
market to another, instead of indirectly estimating risk spillover by recovering
the first and second conditional moments of financial series. In our empirical
application, we also take into account the contemporaneous correlation by
identifying the structural shocks using a standard Cholesky decomposition.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Data Description
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns
Mean Std Min Max Skew Kurt JB.test Q(10) LM(10)
US 0.009 1.284 -9.470 10.957 -0.184 11.018 10125.00 96.37 1006.90
AU 0.015 1.013 -8.704 5.628 -0.490 9.016 5874.00 38.73 851.79
CN 0.023 1.575 -9.256 9.401 -0.102 7.328 2836.50 76.69 274.80
HK 0.008 1.554 -13.582 13.407 -0.070 10.955 9759.00 59.58 888.53
IN 0.044 1.577 -11.809 15.990 -0.185 9.841 7311.60 28.17 444.03
JP -0.002 1.558 -12.111 13.235 -0.412 9.172 5950.10 33.20 928.15
KR 0.016 1.642 -12.805 11.284 -0.555 8.705 5218.10 16.05 496.67
RU 0.056 2.231 -20.657 25.226 -0.217 16.280 27298.00 31.21 587.50
SG 0.007 1.206 -8.696 7.531 -0.266 8.080 4094.30 38.09 752.99
SZ 0.032 1.754 -9.750 9.530 -0.113 6.331 1684.10 66.48 286.90
TW 0.002 1.443 -6.912 6.525 -0.178 5.543 1029.10 50.56 451.46
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns 
Note 1: Q(10) is the Box-Pierce test statistic with 10 lags, which is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared with 10 degrees of
freedom.
Note 2: LM(10) is the Lagrange multiplier test statistic with 10 lags, which is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared with 10
degrees of freedom.
Note 3: The 5% critical value for χ^2 (10) is 18.307 and the 1% critical value for χ^2 (10) is 23.209.
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The data for this study are extracted from Bloomberg and consist of closing
prices of daily stock market index of the U.S. S&P Composite Index (US) and
ten major Asian stock indices: Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index
(CN), Hong Kong Hang Seng Index (HK), India SENSEX Index (IN), Japan
NIKKEI 225 Index (JP), Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KO), Russia
MICEX Index (RU), Singapore FTSE Straits Times Index (SG), Shenzhen
Component Index (SZ), Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index (TW), and
Australia ASX 100 Index (AU).6 The data sets span from January 3, 2000 to
Dec 31, 2014. The daily returns of these indices are computed as:
rit = ln(Pit/Pit−1) ∗ 100
where rit stands for the daily return of the indices, and Pit stands for the
closing price.
Table 1.1 displays the summary statistics of the daily returns of these eleven
indices. It first shows that most of these markets have experienced a positive
average return during the sample period, except Japan. Table 1.1 also reports
that Asian emerging markets are in general featured with greater volatility.
For instance, we document two highest variances of 2.231 in Russia market
and 1.754 in the Shenzhen market. Compared with the variance of 1.284 in
the U.S. market, we highlight the instability of the investment in these Asian
6The abbreviations for different indices carry forward for the further analysis.
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emerging stock markets. Meanwhile, Table 1.1 reports that all the return series
are left-skewed and leptokurtic. Such non-normal properties are also captured
by the highly significant JarqueBera test statistic. This implies that all these
indices have a distribution with an asymmetric fat tail toward negative values,
confirming the importance of differentiating the gains and losses in analyzing
the market risk. Furthermore, the Box and Pierce (1970) type portmanteau
statistics suggest the existence of mild autocorrelation in each series. The
Engle (1982) tests of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH)
effect clearly reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effect in all series and
indicate the substantial autocorrelation in variance. As a result, appropriate
AR-GARCH models seem adequate to accommodate the statistical feature of
each series and thereafter filter out the volatility clustering.
Before proceeding to the model estimation, we have employed the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) test and the Phillips-Perron
(Phillips and Perron, 1988) test to check the stationarity of all the series. Our
findings show that all the ADF and PP test statistics are significant at the 1%
level, thereby indicating that all the return series are stationary.7
7These statistics are available upon request.
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Table 1.2: Estimation Results of AR-GARCH Model
US AU CN HK IN JP KO RU SG SZ TW
b0 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.026 0.049** 0.102*** 0.004 0.056*** 0.122*** 0.037*** 0.015 0.044**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.013) (0.025) (0.018)
b1 -0.062*** -0.040** -0.003 0.008 0.078*** -0.015 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.013 0.052***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
b2 -0.032* 0.016 0.016 -0.006 -0.021 0.017 0.001 -0.033* -0.008 0.017 0.014
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
b3 -0.010 0.002 0.024 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.015 -0.002 0.032* 0.020 -0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
ω 0.026*** 0.008*** 0.028** 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.013*** 0.104** 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.004) (0.042) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005)
α1 0.005 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.012 0.116*** 0.097*** 0.014 0.106*** 0.094*** 0.073*** 0.014
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
α2 0.117*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.064***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020)
β1 0.860*** 0.910*** 0.921*** 0.912*** 0.871*** 0.888*** 0.914*** 0.872*** 0.904*** 0.916*** 0.915***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Q(10) 7.681 9.180 13.389 8.930 13.934 2.256 11.283 11.739 10.089 13.274 15.704
LM(10) 6.942 7.852 4.185 14.626 19.250 6.013 15.566 4.319 4.261 4.661 11.065
AIC 2.876 2.519 3.571 3.369 3.444 3.518 3.463 4.085 2.855 3.814 3.320
BIC 2.889 2.531 3.590 3.383 3.456 3.530 3.477 4.097 2.867 3.833 3.336
Note 1: Q(10) is the Box-Pierce test statistic on squared standardized residuals with 10 lags.
Note 2: LM(10) is the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic on the autocorrelation of the squared standardized residuals with 10 lags.
Note 3: The 1%, 5% and 10% critical value for χ^2 (10) are 23.209, 18.307 and 15.987, respectively.
*** p<0.01.
  ** p<0.05.
    * p<0.10.
Table 1.2: Estimation Results of AR-GARCH model
1.3.2 Model Estimation
In this section, we employ the filtered historical simulation (FHS) to calcu-
late univariate VaR. In the empirical finance literature, it is often found that
GARCH(1,1) models can capture most volatility clustering of financial time se-
ries. We fit the AR(3)-GARCH(1,1) model to all the series. If the specification
is not adequate, we then add more lag terms to clear out self-dependence.8
Table 1.2 summarizes the QMLE results of univariate GARCH models for
8The empirical results show that the AR(3) model is adequate for most of markets to
capture the self-dependence in mean. The only two exceptions are Shanghai Stock Exchange
Composite Index (CN) and Shenzhen Component Index (SZ). To capture the remaining
auto-correlation, we adopt AR(6) model for CN and SZ. Notably, the reasonable change of
length of lags does not affect the test results in the following section.
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each index. Firstly, it shows the little serial correlation in the mean of these
return series, which is reflected by the limited number of significant autore-
gressive coefficients. In general, this stays in line with the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH), indicating that the past information has weak predictive
power for future returns. However, moving to the second moment, we ob-
serve obvious volatility clustering, which is shown by the significant GARCH
coefficients for all indices. In Table 1.2, we also present estimated parame-
ters and diagnostic statistics for model adequacy. The corresponding p-values
of portmanteau statistics for autocorrelation in standardized residuals are all
above 0.10, so are the p-values of a similar test for autocorrelation in squared
standardized residuals. The only exception is India’s market. However, for
India, the corresponding LM test statistic is also insignificant at the 1% level. 9
These results imply the adequacy of the specified models for each index, which
means that our model can capture all the first and second moment variation
that can be explained by its past information. Based on the model we con-
struct, the VaR estimates can be easily calculated by substituting the draws
from the filtered residuals into the estimated GARCH model.
9We experiment the GARCH(1,2), GARCH(2,1) and GARCH(2,2) for India’s market.
The corresponding p-values of LM statistics are all below 0.10. However, given the substan-
tial reduction of LM statistics compared to the corresponding raw returns in Table 1.1, we
are safe to claim that the GARCH(1,1) model are valid to capture the most of the volatility
clustering for India’s market.
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Table 1.3: Risk Spillover between the U.S. and Asian Stock Markets
M 5 10 20 M 5 10 20
US→AU 182.702*** 130.541*** 90.926*** US→KO 76.236*** 56.061*** 40.329***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
US←AU 6.254*** 4.425*** 4.231*** US←KO 16.903*** 12.187*** 8.27***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
US→CN 1.937** 1.16 0.503 US→RU 11.535*** 8.467*** 5.856***
0.026 0.123 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000
US←CN 1.781** 0.958 0.2 US←RU 39.611*** 28.533*** 20.99***
0.037 0.169 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000
US→HK 80.404*** 59.387*** 42.934*** US→SG 120.698*** 89.051*** 62.879***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
US←HK 19.147*** 14.496*** 11.59*** US←SG 32.153*** 23.612*** 16.977***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
US→IN 22.805*** 17.898*** 13.117*** US→SZ 2.263** 1.513* 0.623
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.065 0.267
US←IN 5.09*** 3.433*** 3.253*** US←SZ 0.334 0.175 0.269
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.369 0.431 0.394
US→JP 92.303*** 66.643*** 47.197*** US→TW 35.029*** 28.504*** 21.912***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
US←JP 4.416*** 3.134*** 2.255* US←TW 6.332*** 6.252*** 5.15***
0.000 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note 1: M is the integer in Daniell kernel.
Note 2: “→” and “←” represents the one-way tests (Q1) for causality from the former to the latter and the latter
to the former with respect to with respect to It-1.
 *** p<0.01.
   ** p<0.05.
     * p<0.10.
1.3.3 Value at Risk and Risk Spillover
In this section, we examine the existence of risk spillover between the U.S. and
Asian major stock markets by adopting the two test statistics presented earlier.
Table 1.3 reports the kernel-based test statistics at the 5% risk level, together
23
Figure 1.2: Risk Spillover from the U.S. to Asian Stock Markets
Figure 1.2: Risk Spillover From the U.S. to Asian Major Stock Markets        
Note: The plot shows the sample cross-quatilogram, tesing the risk spillover from the U.S. to Asian major markets. Bar
graphs describe sample cross-quantilograms and lines are the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals centered  at zero. Risk are
defined as 0.05 quantile.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.3: Risk Spillover from Asian Stock Markets to the U.S.
Figure 1.3: Risk Spillover From Asian Major Stock Markets to the U.S.        
Note: The plot shows the sample cross-quatilogram, tesing the risk spillover from Asian major markets to the U.S. market.
Bar graphs describe sample cross-quantilograms and lines are the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals centered at zero. Risk
are defined as 0.05 quantile.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with their p-values.10 We use the Daniell kernel and report M= 5, 10 and 20.11
For each country pair, the first row presents one-way test statistics for whether
the U.S. market Granger-causes the Asian markets in risk, with respect to the
information Ft−1. The second row documents the counterparts. The empirical
results show that there exists the significant quantile interaction between the
U.S. market and Asian markets. On the one hand, the extreme downside risk
in the U.S. market helps to predict the occurrence of market risks in Asian
stock markets. Feedback effects also exist from the Asian markets to the U.S.
market. In addition, the test statistics from the U.S. to Asian markets are
in general much larger than their counterparts, which suggests the stronger
risk spillover effect from the dominant U.S. market to Asian markets. One
exception is Russia’s market, we document higher feedback effect from Russia
to the U.S, compared to its counterpart. One possible explanation is that the
Russia’s market is highly correlated with the European markets, who have a
stronger impact on the U.S. financial market. Also, the stock markets in the
Mainland China deserve further emphasis. We document marginal significant
risk spillovers between the markets of the U.S. and Mainland China. In fact,
10We also experiment test statistics at the 1% and 10% risk levels. In general, they deliver
the similar risk interdependency patterns. To conserve the space, we concentrate the results
at the 5% risk levels as the baseline case. We will further discuss the downside risk at the 1%
and 10% level in section 1.3.4, which investigates the asymmetric property of international
transmission patterns.
11Because commonly used non-uniform kernels deliver similar power, we only report the
results based on the Daniell kernel.
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these empirical evidence fit our expectation. Although China’s stock market
is ranked as the second largest market in terms of market capitalization, it
is famous for their large volatility and high risk. They are viewed by many
observers as a ‘casino’. The inside information and country specific factors may
govern the extreme movements in these markets, instead of the information
flows reflected by the international markets.
To further assess the micro-structure of risk spillover, we plot the cross-
quantilogram ρˆ(k) between the U.S. and Asian major markets in Figure 1.2
and Figure 1.3. In each graph, we show the 95% bootstrap confidence inter-
vals for no quantile dependence based on 1000 bootstrapped replicates and
the cross-quantilogram for 60 period. In Figure 1.2, each graph presents the
cross-quantilogram from the U.S. to Asian markets. In Figure 1.3, each graph
shows the cross-quantilogram from Asian markets to the U.S. Overall, the re-
sults delivered by these cross-quantilogram patterns with bootstrap confidence
intervals are consistent with kernel based statistics. They confirm the existence
of risk spillover from the U.S. to most of Asian major stock markets, as well as
the feedback effect. Notably, the significant cross-quantilograms largely exist
within the first period. This not only supports the theory of efficient market
hypothesis (EMH), showing that the extreme negative information can still
be quickly digested by the foreign markets, but also suggests the adequacy to
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capture these cross-quantile interactions by adopting the multivariate model
with a short order of lag terms.
1.3.4 VAR for VaR
After confirming the existence of two-way risk spillovers, we employ the bi-
variate VAR for VaR model (White, Kim and Manganelli, 2015) to trace out
the dynamic tail interdependency structure between these markets. In our
framework, the dependent variable in the first equation is the 5% quantile of
the U.S. market return r1t, and the dependent variable in the second equation
is the 5% quantile of corresponding Asian market’s return r2t. Since in each
day the opening hours of Asian markets is earlier than the U.S. market, we
assume that shocks to r2t Granger cause the change of r1t contemporaneously,
but shocks to r1t do not have the instant direct impact on r2t.
Table 1.4 reports the estimation results for the bivariate VAR for VaR sys-
tem. One point deserves further emphasis is that each of the ten bivariate
models is estimated using different information set. Hence it might generate
different estimates for the U.S. market. However, these bivariate results can
still provide useful summary information and shed light on the research ques-
tion that how the market risks transmit between the U.S. and Asian major
markets. More specifically, Table 1.4 shows that, for most of the markets,
some of the non-diagonal coefficients of the A or B matrices are significantly
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Table 1.4: Estimates and Standard Errors, VAR for VaR Model
AU KO
c1 a11 a12 b11 b12 c1 a11 a12 b11 b12
      0.09       0.03      -0.17***       0.69***       0.41**      -0.06***      -0.21***      -0.05**       0.88***      -0.03***
     (0.08)      (0.08)      (0.06)      (0.09)      (0.17)      (0.02)      (0.03)      (0.02)      (0.02)      (0.01)
c2 a21 a22 b21 b22 c2 a21 a22 b21 b22
     -0.34**      -0.53***      -0.12**       0.39***      -0.10      -0.08***      -0.25***      -0.13***      -0.13***       0.93***
     (0.12)      (0.06)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.10)      (0.02)      (0.05)      (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.02)
CN RU
c1 a11 a12 b11 b12 c1 a11 a12 b11 b12
      0.01      -0.18***      -0.03       0.89***       0.01       -0.02      -0.12***      -0.06***       0.93**       -0.02*
     (0.02)      (0.07)      (0.02)      (0.03)      (0.01)      (0.01)      (0.03)      (0.01)      (0.02)      (0.01)
c2 a21 a22 b21 b22 c2 a21 a22 b21 b22
     -0.02       -0.01      -0.11***       0.00       0.94***      -0.02      -0.01      -0.22***       0.00       0.89***
     (0.02)      (0.04)      (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.02)      (0.02)      (0.10)      (0.04)      (0.05)      (0.02)
HK SG
c1 a11 a12 b11 b12 c1 a11 a12 b11 b12
     -0.02      -0.21***      -0.03       0.84***       0.03       0.04       0.05      -0.14**       0.50**       0.51**
     (0.03)      (0.04)      (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.10)      (0.08)      (0.05)      (0.21)      (0.26)
c2 a21 a22 b21 b22 c2 a21 a22 b21 b22
     -0.03      -0.17***      -0.07***      -0.13***       0.99***      -0.13      -0.41***      -0.06       0.29*       0.40*
     (0.03)      (0.04)      (0.02)      (0.04)      (0.03)      (0.11)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.15)      (0.21)
IN SZ
c1 a11 a12 b11 b12 c1 a11 a12 b11 b12
-0.04* -0.20*** -0.04* 0.89*** -0.02       0.00      -0.17***      -0.03***       0.90***       0.00
(0.02) 0.07 (0.02) (0.03) 0.02      (0.02)      (0.07)      (0.01)      (0.03)      (0.01)
c2 a21 a22 b21 b22 c2 a21 a22 b21 b22
-0.06*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.09*** 0.90***      0.00      -0.01      -0.09***      0.00       0.95***
0.02 (0.04) (0.04) 0.02 (0.02)      (0.01)      (0.02)      (0.02)      (0.01)      (0.01)
JP TW
c1 a11 a12 b11 b12 c1 a11 a12 b11 b12
      -0.06***      -0.22***      -0.03       0.89***       -0.03      -0.04***      -0.21***      -0.05***       0.88***      -0.01
     (0.02)      (0.05)      (0.04)      (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.01)      (0.03)      (0.02)      (0.02)      (0.02)
c2 a21 a22 b21 b22 c2 a21 a22 b21 b22
     -0.09***      -0.26***       -0.11*       -0.12***       0.91***      -0.04***      -0.18***      -0.11***      -0.10***       0.95***
     (0.02)      (0.07)      (0.06)      (0.04)      (0.04)      (0.01)      (0.04)      (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.02)
Table 1.4: Estimates and Standard Errors, VAR for VaR Model
Note: Estimated coefficients are in the first row. Standard errors are reported in brackets in second row. The coefficients correspond to the
VAR for VaR model reported in Eq.(14) of the paper.
*** p<0.01.
  ** p<0.05.
    * p<0.10.
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Figure 1.4: Estimated 5% Quantile for Asian Markets
Figure 1.4: Estimated 5% Quantile for Asian Markets
Note: The charts report the in-sample 5% daily Value at Risk (VaR) for Asian major stock markets (red dots), together with the daily
return (blue dots). The VaR is computed from a bivariate VAR for VaR model, where the first equation contains the quantile of the
U.S. market and the second equation contains the quantile of the corresponding Asian markets.
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different from zero. This illustrates how the multivariate quantile model can
uncover dynamics that cannot be detected by estimating univariate quantile
models, hence capturing the two-way risk spillovers. For example, we docu-
ment the significance of all the coefficients for Korea, implying that the VaR of
the Korea’s stock market depends not only on the information in the domes-
tic market, but also on the information in international markets. Again, the
China’s markets tend to be more immune to the shocks in the international
stock markets. It’s reflected by the non-significant a21 and b21 coefficients in
the VAR for VaR framework.
Based on the multivariate quantile model we estimated, we construct the
multivariate VaR measure for the Asian markets. The resulting estimated
5% quantiles for each economy are reported in Figure 1.4. These quantile
plots clearly reveal the sharp increase in the market risk following the recent
great recession. Carefully inspection of the plots also shows a noticeable cross-
sectional difference, with the risk for China’s market being contained to about
one third of the risk for Japanese markets. This indicates that investing in
the China’s market can help the investors to achieve the risk-sharing. On the
other hand, the extreme downside movements in the U.S. are associated with
a significant lowering of VaR on rest of countries, showing these markets are
highly integrated in terms of risk spillover.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse-Response Functions of Asian Markets to a Two-standard
Deviation Shock in the U.S. Market
Note: The plots report the quantile impluse-reponse functions of Asian major stock markets to a shock in the U.S. market, together
with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.5 displays the pseudo impulse response functions of the risks (and
associated 95% confidence intervals) of the Asian markets to a two-standard-
deviation shock to the U.S. market. The horizontal axis measures the time
(expressed in days), while the vertical axis measures the change in the 5%
quantiles of the Asian indices (expressed in percentage returns) as a reaction
to the U.S shock. The pseudo impulse response functions document how this
shock propagates through the international risk transmission mechanism and
how long it takes to absorb it. The shock is completely digested when the
pseudo impulse response function has converged to zero.
A closer look at the pseudo impulse response functions of the ten mar-
kets reveals substantially distinct patterns in how their long run risks react
to the U.S. shocks. For instance, the English speaking high-income markets
in our sample, Australia and Singapore, have similar pseudo impulse response
patterns. Risks in the U.S. market significantly lower these markets’ VaR.
More specifically, a two-standard-deviation percentage point decline in the
U.S. market generates 1.39 percentage point decrease of VaR for Australia
and 1.07 percentage point decrease of VaR for Singapore. Besides, the shocks
are digested quickly by these markets. Risks in the U.S. market also have sig-
nificant but weaker impacts on the Hong Kong, India, Japan, and Taiwan. For
example, given the U.S. shock, the Korea’s market experiences 0.64 percent-
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age point lower of VaR. However, Russia and China markets’ quantiles exhibit
very little tail co-dependence with the U.S. market, and not statistically sig-
nificant, as illustrated by the error bands straddling the zero line. It indicates
that the inside information and country specific factors may govern the ex-
treme movement in these markets, other than the information flows reflected
in the international equity markets.
Figure 1.6 plots the counterparts, the impulse responses of the risk in the
U.S. market to a shock in Asian stock markets. One fact deserves emphasis
is that the U.S. market is also significantly affected by the Asian markets in
terms of risk, despite the magnitude is much muted compared to the U.S.
effect. It suggests the growing influence of Asian financial markets. Again, we
document two English speaking high-income countries in our sample, Australia
and Singapore, have a strongest impact on the U.S. market. A two-standard-
deviation change of these markets’ indices triggers 0.48 and 0.39 percentage
point decline in VaR in the U.S. market. Focusing on Hong Kong, India, Japan
and Taiwan, risks in these economies have significant impacts on the VaR in
the U.S. as well. Risks in China and Russia market also have the significant
predictive power of the risk in the U.S. market. For example, a two-standard-
deviation shock in the two Mainland China’s indices significantly leads to
roughly 0.15 percentage point decline of VaR in the U.S. market. It gradually
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Figure 1.6: Impulse-Response Functions of the U.S. to a Two-standard Devi-
ation Shock in Asian Markets
Note: The plots report the quantile impluse-reponse functions of the U.S. market to the shocks in Asian major stock markets, together
with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1.6: Impulse-Response Functions of U.S.to a Two-Standard Deviation Shock in Asian Markets
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dies off in the following 50 days.
In sum, the analysis above show a two-way tail interdependence patterns,
and provide the estimates of change of the risks in each market given the for-
eign shocks. We stress the importance of accounting for the reverse causality
and construct a unified multivariate framework in analyzing the international
risk transmission structure. Given the fast growing status of the Asian finan-
cial markets and rising degree of global integration, even the most dominant
market, like the U.S., can also be affected by the foreign shocks in terms of
risk transmission.
Time-varying Nature of Risk Transmission Mechanism
The world economic and financial landscape has shifted dramatically in the
recent years. Globalization spurs a rising financial integration and enhances
the cross-country financial linkages. On the other hand, with the rise of the
emerging economies, their financial markets have experienced an astonishing
growth and unprecedented development as well. These stylized facts lead to a
question of considerable interest that how the shift of the global economic and
financial landscape would affect the international risk transmission mechanism
across countries.
In this section, we investigate the time-varying property of the interna-
tional risk transmission mechanism between the U.S. and Asian markets. To
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shed light on this issue, we divide our data set into three parts: the pre-crisis
period from January 3, 2000 to June 30, 2007; the crisis-period from July 1,
2007 to June 30, 2009; and the post-crisis period from July 1, 2009 to Decem-
ber 31, 2014. Since the crisis-period contains only short time span with few
observations, quantile analysis based on that may lead to distorted results. 12
Therefore, we assess the time-varying property of international risk transmis-
sion mechanism by directly comparing the results in the pre-crisis period and
post-crisis period.13 To make the results comparable, we also standardize the
shocks in the post-crisis period to the same level of pre-crisis period.
Figure 1.7 first summarizes the average pseudo impulse response patterns
between the U.S. and Asian markets, across the pre-crisis period and post-crisis
period. The average is obtained by averaging all the corresponding pseudo
impulse response functions with equal weights. The left column of Figure 1.7
documents the average tail impact of a two-standard-deviation U.S. shock on
the Asian markets. It suggests that shocks in the U.S. have experienced a rising
predictive power of the risk in the Asian markets over time. Quantitatively
speaking, the initial impact of the U.S. shocks increase from -0.25 to -0.61.
The right column of Figure 1.7 documents the average tail impact of a two-
12Also, the financial crisis may create the extraordinary multilateral relationships.
13The main results largely remain the same if we attach the data of crisis period to either
pre-crisis period or post-crisis period.
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standard-deviation Asian shock on the U.S. market. These empirical results
are even more striking since the average instant effect is tripled in the post-
crisis period, compared to the earlier era. In short, these average plots provide
the first evidence of changing tail interdependency structure between the U.S.
and Asian markets.
To put the graphical pattern into a numerical perspective and investigate
the individual effect, we tabulate the instant effects on each country in Ta-
ble 1.5. The ‘difference’ column is obtained by calculating the difference of
the instant pseudo impulse response between pre-crisis period and the post-
crisis period. This measures how the instant impact move towards the negative
side, and therefore the positive value is associated with a stronger negative im-
pact. Table 1.5 shows that, on average, the instant impact of a two-standard-
deviation shock in the U.S. markets on the Asian markets has increased by
0.30. On the other hand, the Asian markets have also experienced a rising
influential power. On average, we documents that the instant impact of Asian
markets on the U.S. market has increased by 0.16. Moving to the individual
effect, we also confirm the rising risk integration on the individual level, by
reporting a large fraction of markets with the positive sign. Moreover, except
the Singapore market, the economic size of remaining negative value is also
negligible.
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Figure 1.7: Time-varying Pattern of Tail Interdependence
Figure 1.7: Time-varying Pattern of Tail Dependence 
Note: To make the results comparable, the shocks in the post-crisis period have been normalized to the same level of pre-crisis period.
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Overall, we show a general rising tail interdependence structure between
the U.S. and Asian markets. Both shocks in Asian and the U.S. markets
have a stronger predictive power for the risk in foreign markets. In other
words, international stock markets are more integrated in terms of the risk
transmission. Also, it indicates that investing in the Asian market provides
fewer opportunity if one seeks for risk sharing and portfolio diversification
nowadays.
Asymmetric Property of International Transmission Mechanism
In most of the existing literature, researchers adopt volatilty to measure the
risk and focus on the volatility spillovers. One underlying restriction of these
studies is that they treat gains and losses in a symmetric way. However,
in practice, the different quantiles of a return series may respond in a very
different way given external shocks. One underlying reason is that market
participants behave very differently with the positive or negative information.
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Table 1.5: Time-varying Nature of Tail Interdependence
US→Asia US←Asia US→Asia US←Asia US→Asia US←Asia
Average -0.31 -0.09 -0.61 -0.25 0.30 0.16
AU -0.68 -0.03 -1.04 -0.32 0.36 0.29
CN 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.15 0.08 0.06
HK -0.11 -0.10 -0.88 -0.04 0.77 -0.06
IN -0.35 -0.11 -0.34 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09
JP -0.26 -0.04 -0.39 -0.10 0.13 0.06
KO -0.41 -0.16 -1.03 -0.44 0.61 0.28
RU 0.02 -0.07 -0.39 -0.26 0.41 0.19
SG -1.17 -0.20 -0.79 -0.35 -0.38 0.15
SZ 0.09 -0.16 -0.05 -0.22 0.14 0.06
TW -0.25 0.02 -1.18 -0.61 0.93 0.63
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference
Note: To make the results comparable, the shocks in the post-crisis period have been normalized to the same
level of pre-crisis period.  The `difference' column is obtained by calculating the difference of the instant
pseudo impulse response between pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period.
Table 1.5: Time-varying Nature of Tail Interdependence
In this section, we examine this asymmetric property of the international risk
transmission mechanism. The objective is to show how the market reactions
vary across gains and losses.
We present the instant effects of a U.S. shock on Asian economies in Table
1.6, across different quantiles. We pick 1%, 5% and 10% to measure the
losses since they are commonly used VaR level, and 99%, 95% and 90% are
the corresponding gains. The ‘asymmetric’ column is obtained by calculating
the absolute difference between losses and gains, measuring the asymmetric
response given the external shocks.14 Table 1.7 reports the corresponding
14This measure may be not valid for the markets with abnormal pseudo impulse response
functions. For example, we document positive 0.05 instant reaction in the Shanghai Stock
Exchange Composite Index (CN) on the 1% quantile. In this case, the absolute difference
calculation is not exactly capturing the asymmetric patterns. However, given the limited
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instant effects of Asian markets’ shocks on the U.S.
In Table 1.6, we document substantial asymmetric response patterns of
the Asian responses given the U.S. shocks, showing that the extreme down-
side market risks are easier to transmit across the markets. On average, the
absolute difference is 0.31 in the 1% and 99% pair, 0.29 in the 5% and 99%
pair, and 0.14 in the 10% and 90% pair. These results not only confirm the
presence of substantial asymmetric patterns, but also suggest that the extreme
risks (for example, 1% quantile) are more likely to be affected by the shocks in
the U.S. markets, compared to the moderate risk (for example, 10% quantile).
Focusing on each country, a large fraction of markets shows the systematic
patterns on average. The difference in results mainly lie in the China’s mar-
ket and Russia’s market. However, again, most of these values are moderate,
which would not affect our main conclusion.
In contrast, we find considerable symmetric response patterns of the U.S.
market given the Asian shocks, in Table 1.7. On average, we document the
absolute difference of 0.04 in the 1% and 99% pair, 0.05 in the 5% and 99%
pair, and -0.02 in the 10% and 90% pair. This symmetric response pattern
is further confirmed if we directly compare the value within each quantile
pair. For example, the average instant response of the U.S. market is -0.29
number and modest value of abnormal reactions, we report this measure for all the series
to make the interpretation consistency.
41
Table 1.6: Asymmetric Property, U.S. to Asia
1% 99% Asymmetric  5% 95% Asymmetric 10% 90% Asymmetric
Average -0.62 0.31 0.31 -0.52 0.18 0.29 -0.30 0.11 0.14
AU -1.16 0.30 0.86 -1.38 0.30 1.09 -0.38 0.30 0.07
CN 0.05 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.13 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.10
HK -1.15 0.54 0.62 -0.45 0.41 0.04 -0.35 0.21 0.14
IN -0.47 0.34 0.14 -0.45 0.25 0.20 -0.28 -0.09 0.19
JP -0.61 0.53 0.09 -0.66 0.23 0.44 -0.63 0.22 0.41
KO -0.69 0.07 0.62 -0.64 0.20 0.44 -0.46 0.23 0.23
RU -0.39 0.69 -0.30 -0.02 0.18 -0.16 -0.23 0.06 0.17
SG -0.63 0.32 0.31 -1.07 0.25 0.82 -0.34 0.17 0.17
SZ -0.09 0.17 -0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.09 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08
TW -1.01 0.05 0.95 -0.47 0.18 0.29 -0.34 0.18 0.15
Note: The `asymmetric' column is obtained by calculating the absolute difference between losses and gains, measuring the asymmetric response given the external
shocks.
Table 1.6: Asymmetric Property, US→Asia 
at 1% quantile level, which is similar to 0.24 at the 99% quantile level in the
absolute terms. For each country, we document a substantial heterogeneity.
We report 47% negative asymmetric measure and 53% positive asymmetric
measure. They all lead to the conclusion that there is no consistent asymmetric
patterns in the U.S. reactions, given the Asian shocks.
In short, we document fairly average symmetric patterns of the U.S. re-
sponses to the Asian market shocks, but substantial asymmetric response pat-
terns of the Asian markets to the U.S. shocks. We illustrate the potential
weakness of adopting volatility to measure the market risk. Meanwhile, our
analysis on the distributional interdependence across different quantile also
contribute to a better understanding of how different types of information
transmit between financial markets.
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Table 1.7: Asymmetric Property, Asia to U.S.
1% 99% Asymmetric 5% 95% Asymmetric 10% 90% Asymmetric
Average -0.29 0.24 0.04 -0.24 0.20 0.05 -0.13 0.15 -0.02
AU -0.68 0.35 0.34 -0.48 0.29 0.19 -0.29 0.26 0.04
CN -0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.15 0.01 0.15 -0.08 0.03 0.05
HK -0.08 0.26 -0.18 -0.19 0.20 -0.01 -0.08 0.16 -0.08
IN -0.43 0.13 0.30 -0.19 0.24 -0.05 -0.13 0.13 -0.01
JP -0.16 0.63 -0.47 -0.17 0.36 -0.19 -0.09 0.16 -0.07
KO -0.36 0.07 0.28 -0.24 0.31 -0.06 -0.12 0.21 -0.09
RU -0.19 0.38 -0.19 -0.22 0.17 0.05 -0.12 0.09 0.03
SG -0.28 0.20 0.08 -0.39 0.23 0.16 -0.16 0.28 -0.11
SZ -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.16 -0.10 0.01 0.09
TW -0.51 0.20 0.30 -0.24 0.16 0.08 -0.12 0.13 -0.01
Table 1.7: Asymmetric Property, Asia→US 
Note: The 'asymmetric' column is obtained by calculating the absolute difference between losses and gains, measuring the asymmetric response given the external
shocks.
1.4 Concluding Marks
This paper investigates the international risk transmission mechanism between
the U.S. and Asian major stock markets. Instead of using volatility to repre-
sent the risk, we directly focus on the left tail probabilities and utilize the VaR
to measure the market risk. By applying two recently introduced test statis-
tics based on Cross-Quantilogram function, we first confirm the existence of
risk spillover from the U.S. to Asian major stock markets, as well as reverse
feedback effects. Furthermore, we adopt the multivariate quantile regression
(VAR for VaR) model to quantitively uncover these tail-interdependency pat-
terns, showing how the extreme downside risk transmits between the U.S. and
Asian markets.
Our results suggest that these stock markets are highly integrated in terms
of risk transmission, and provide the estimates of change of the risk in each
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market given the foreign shocks. More specifically, the extreme downside mar-
ket risk in the U.S. market Granger-causes a substantially lower VaR in the
Asian markets, which stays in line with the its dominant power across the
world stock markets. Besides, price falls in Asian markets also have a weaker
but significant predictive power for the risk in the U.S. market. This indicates
the fast-growing influence of the Asian markets. Overall, we show a two-way
tail interdependence patterns between the U.S. and Asian markets. Therefore,
we stress the importance of accounting for the reverse causality and construct
a unified multivariate framework for analyzing the international risk trans-
mission structure. In this study, we also construct a new multivariate VaR
measure for Asian markets.
The world economic and financial landscape has shifted dramatically in the
recent years. It leads to a question of considerable interest that how the shift of
the global economic and financial landscape would affect the international risk
transmission mechanism across countries. We investigate the time-varying
property of international risk transmission mechanism, and show a general
rising tail interdependence structure between the U.S. and Asian markets.
Both shocks in Asian and the U.S. markets have a stronger predictive power
for the risk in foreign markets. In other words, international stock markets
are more integrated in terms of the risk transmission. Also, it indicates that
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investing in the Asian market provides fewer opportunities if one seeks for risk
sharing and portfolio diversification.
In most of the existing literature, researchers adopt volatilty to measure
the risk and focus on volatility spillovers. One underlying restriction of these
studies is that they treat gains and losses in a symmetric way. However, in
practice, the different quantiles of a return series may respond in a very differ-
ent way given external shocks. In this study, we also examine the asymmetric
property of the international risk transmission mechanism. We document fairly
average symmetric patterns of the U.S. response to the Asian market shocks,
but substantial asymmetric response patterns of the Asian markets to the U.S.
shocks. We illustrate the potential weakness of adopting volatility to measure
the market risk. Meanwhile, our analysis on the distributional interdepen-
dence across different quantiles also contribute to a better understanding of




Growth Shocks and the World
Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007–09 that originated in the U.S. rapidly spread
across borders, which has renewed the interest in evaluating how the interna-
tional transmission mechanism generates a world business cycle. A better
understanding of international transmission of national structural shocks pro-
vides a sound basis for designing the best policy responses to international
developments, and has become a key topic in recent academic and policy dis-
cussions.
There is a rich literature investigating the international transmission mech-
anism. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Grilli and Roubini (1995) use small-
scale vector autoregression (VAR) models to identify the dynamic effects of
46
foreign and domestic monetary shocks. Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005) focus
on the Asian financial crisis and study the transmission mechanism through
trade links. Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega (2007) study the dynamics and
cross-country interdependencies in G-7 countries. Dees et al. (2007) use a
global VAR model to investigate the impact of external shocks on the euro area
economy. Mumtaz and Surico (2009) examine the dynamic effects on the U.K.
economy given an unanticipated shock in the rest of the world, by extending a
Factor-Augmented VAR Approach to the open economy. Most of these stud-
ies have tried to disentangle the contribution of internal and external sources
and to identify the channels of international transmission within a region or a
particular country group. To date, however, there exists no in-depth analysis
of the worldwide macroeconomic interdependence through a large-scale model.
Data limitations and model intractability have heretofore limited attention to
investigating cross-country interdependency structure within a small group of
countries. As a result, our first objective is to engage in a comprehensive global
analysis, with a particular emphasis on quantifying international transmission
mechanism of national growth shocks across a wide range of economies in the
world.
Uncovering the dynamics of interdependence by constructing a worldwide
dynamic system is important for academic researchers, policy makers and reg-
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ulatory institutions. First, since the world economies are highly integrated,
including a small number of countries is unlikely to correctly capture interna-
tional spillovers that underestimate the indirect multiplier effect and lead to
the omitted variable problem.1 Second, given the rising prominence of emerg-
ing and developing markets, a narrow focus on some country groups is no
longer tenable. Third, in a small scale model, impulse responses can only be
observed for the small group of included countries. This does not meet the
increasing demand for information especially on indirect effects by the policy
makers over the world and international regulatory institutions.
The worldwide cross-country dynamic interdependency structure we at-
tempt to trace out in this paper is interestingly related to the literature that
investigates the world business cycle. Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) em-
ploy a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model to study the common dynamic
properties of business cycle fluctuations in a 60-country sample, providing ev-
idence of a world business cycle. Stock and Watson (2005b) use a structural
factor VAR to identify common international shocks. Kose, Otrok and White-
man (2008); Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2012) further evaluate the evolution of
this world business cycle as well as macroeconomic comovements within differ-
ent regions or country groups. Essentially, they employ the dynamic factor ap-
1We discuss this issue in detail in the empirical section.
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proach to simultaneously capture the contemporaneous and dynamic spillover
effects of shocks, without prior restrictions on the direction of these spillovers,
the mechanism that generates these shocks, or the underlying channels that
facilitate the spillovers.2 Our work complements this current research by un-
covering the international transmission mechanism that generates the world
business cycle. We hope this is one step closer to a better understanding of
the sources of the world business cycle. The empirical results indicate that the
international transmission mechanism we trace out in this paper can largely
capture the common dynamic properties of business cycle fluctuations in the
world, providing an economic foundation for the world business cycle.
Trade linkages and financial linkages are two main channels that generate
the commonality of economic activities in the world. To link all the major
economies and investigate dynamic interdependence among them, we imple-
ment a trade-linked structural vector-autoregressive (SVAR) model with re-
alistic identification restrictions. More specifically, we utilize bilateral-export
flows to construct a worldwide dynamic interdependence system, connecting
national output growth across a large country set (60 economies plus the rest
of the world), over a long time span (1985-2013). The country set contains
2Bai and Wang (2015) seems to be the only paper that attempts to trace out the transmis-
sion pattern in a dynamic factor model framework. They introduce identification conditions
for multilevel factor models, and allow them to study the spillover effects of shocks arising
from one group on another. They later apply their approach on to international bonds
market.
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not only the industrial countries and emerging market economies, but also
the major developing countries since they are highly involved in the globaliza-
tion process as well. We are particularly interested in the time period from
1985 to 2013 because this is the era when the remarkable globalization pro-
cess takes place (Kose, Otrok and Prasad, 2012). The method, along with a
comprehensive data set, allows us to construct a large-scale global dynamic in-
terdependency system and uncover the international transmission mechanism
among the major economies.
The trade-linked SVAR model presented in this paper is built on the work of
Abeysinghe (1999, 2001b) and Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005). We advance the
early work by developing a variance decomposition procedure and construct-
ing bootstrap confidence intervals for the impulse response analysis. Besides,
unlike the pervious papers, we further extend the country set to the world.
This is essential to construct the global interdependency system for studying
the international transmission mechanism behind the world business cycle.
The method we develop has three appealing features: First, it allows us to
summarize the information from large country sets by imposing an economic
structure, without having to rely on purely statistical methods. This further
allows us to identify both the direct bilateral effect and indirect multiplier
effect in investigating the cross-country interdependence. Second, it utilizes
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economic theory to develop a realistic identification scheme that imposes re-
strictions on both contemporaneous links and lag dynamics. It avoids adopting
an arbitrary recursive identification scheme as is frequently done in the VAR
literature. Another key contribution of this method is that the cross-country
relationships are allowed to change over time. This reflects the time-varying
nature of international links. It enables us to assess the transmission mecha-
nism before and after a major crisis without having to split the sample into
different periods.
Once our trade-linked SVAR model is estimated, we can trace out the dy-
namic responses of each of the 61 economies to innovations in a particular
economy. We, however, limit our focus and highlight two cases of interest:
a positive shock (recovery) in the U.S. economy and a negative shock (slow-
down) in the China’s economy. Our empirical findings confirm the dominating
status of the U.S. economy. For example, we show that the expansion of the
U.S. economy generates a significant expansion in Europe. Besides, we pro-
vide further evidence of the existence of the regional effect (Kose, Otrok and
Whiteman, 2003) that was observed for the North American Region. Asian
emerging markets constitute the most energetic economy in recent years. We
show that the movements of the U.S. economy in general profoundly affect the
Asian emerging economies. One exception is China. The shocks in the U.S.
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market only have a moderate impact on China’s economy.
Recently, the impact of China’s economic slowdown on other economies has
been a primary concern of both academia and central governments. Our find-
ings show that the deceleration of China’s growth leads to a significant decline
of growth across the world, suggesting an important role China’s market is
playing in the current global economic landscape. In particular, the slump in
China’s demand triggers a severe crash in Asian emerging markets. This cau-
tions the policy makers in Asian emerging economies to a better preparation
for the potential impacts of a decrease in China’s demand on these markets.
Why do the fluctuations of one influential economy, e.g. the U.S. or China,
produce such a profound impact on the other countries, affecting the economies
even with few direct trade and financial links with them? In this paper, we
further attempt to answer this question by decomposing the impulse response
of each economy into two parts: the direct bilateral effect and indirect multi-
plier effect. Given a U.S. shock, we show that the international transmission
of this shock happens mainly through the indirect multiplier channel, instead
of the direct bilateral channel. This addresses the importance of construct-
ing a global interdependency system covering a wide range of economies in
the world, capturing all the principal transmission channels across the major
economies.
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The trade-linked SVAR system we construct also help us to assess the
evolution of the international transmission mechanism we trace out. The global
economic landscape has shifted dramatically since the mid-1980s. Therefore,
it is very important to capture this time-varying nature of international links.
In this paper, the changing properties of international links are reflected by the
time-varying parameters in the trade-linked SVAR system. By examining the
global impact of four growth engines in different time periods, we document
vast movements of the international transmission patterns. More specifically,
the traditional industrial economies are likely to have experienced a decline
of their external impacts. In contrast, the rise of emerging markets make
themselves more influential under the current international economic structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses primary
international linkages across countries and introduces the trade-linked SVAR
and the dynamic factor model. In this section, we also brief the data set. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the empirical results based on the international transmission
mechanism we trace out in this paper. Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Methodology and Data
2.2.1 Trade Linkages and Cross-border Interdependence
Conventional wisdom suggests that stronger trade linkages would make the
economies more sensitive to external shocks and result in more similar business
cycles. Many studies support this argument (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1997,
1998; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005; Arora and Vamvakidis, 2005; Inklaar,
Jong-A-Pin and de Haan, 2008). In particular, trade linkages could lead to a
higher degree of cross-border interdependence by generating large demand side
effects. For example, a positive growth shock in one country triggers a rising
external demand, boosting the economies of its trading partners. However, if
stronger trade linkages induce a higher level of industrial specifications, the
cross-border interdependence could also be weaker because of more intense
international trade patterns (Krugman, 1993).
Along with the trade linkage, financial linkage is another main channel
which is widely believed to generate the commonality of economic activities in
the world. Despite the vast expansion in the availability of international finan-
cial data over the last 15-20 years, the existing data sets remain inadequate
for the analysis of cross-border financial linkages.3 In this study, although we
develop a trade-linked SVAR to construct the global interdependency system,
3Kubelec and Sa´ (2010) provide a pioneer work on constructing bilateral financial data,
covering 18 major economies. However, their data set is still too narrow for a global analysis.
54
we have to note that, trade linkages can also capture cross-border interac-
tions transmitted by a wide variety of cross-country linkages: flows of goods
and services, flows of foreign direct investment, flows of bank lending, flows
of mutual fund investment, flows of migrants and workers, trade competition
in third markets, etc.4 Besides, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) show high
correlation between trade and financial linkages in a series of tests. As we
shall see later, trade linkages seem capture the effects of other linkages that
emanate from trade linkages well.
2.2.2 An Open Economy Structural VAR
In this section, we develop the trade-linked structural VAR model introduced
in Abeysinghe (1999) and Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005) that we use to obtain
the main results of the paper. In order to measure the dynamic interdepen-
dence of national macroeconomic movements, we construct a large-scale system
simultaneously equating output supply and demand across all major countries
through the trade linkages. We begin by focusing on the determinants of total
output (Yi) for an individual country i. The latter part of this section extends
the framework to a system of equations linking all n countries in the world
(with i=1,2,...,n).
4Glick and Rose (1999) and Forbes (2002) both make the point that trade linkage is
highly correlated with other cross-country linkages.
55
A country i’s output can be written as:
Yi = Xi + Ai (2.1)
where Xi and Ai are the export and non-export components of output, respec-
tively. The country i’s total exports Xi can also be expressed as the sum of




Xij + Ai (2.2)
where Xij denotes the export from country i to country j and j 6= i.5 Writing




dXij + dAi] (2.3)
Exports from country i to country j can be written as a reduced-form function
of output in country j:
Xij = Xij(Yj) (2.4)
Differentiating (2.4) yields:
dXij = (∂Xij/∂Yj)dYj (2.5)




[ηij(Xij/Xi)(dYj/Yj)] + dAi/Yi (2.6)
5This inequality condition continues to apply to all the subsequent equations.
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where ηij = (∂Xij/∂Yj)(Yj/Xij) is the income elasticity of exports with respect
to country j ′s income.
Next, we make an assumption underlying most aggregate export-demand
equations, that income elasticities are equal across foreign counties. As a
result, also for country i, ηij = ηi. Then adding country and time subscripts




it + uit (2.7)




j=1(Xijt/Xit)yjt, and uit captures idiosyncratic
component which can not be explained by trade linkages. A useful character-
istic of equation (2.7) is that the right-hand-side variable is an export-share
weighted average of output growth rates. Equally important is the character-
istic that each export share is allowed to vary over time. A final point is that
αi = ηiXi/Yi is assumed to be time invariant.
Equation (2.7) is central to the estimation results reported below and high-
lights the direct and indirect effect we attempt to structure out, as well as the
key assumptions implicit in this framework. If output growth in every country
j is exogenous to output growth in country i (with i 6= j) then equation (2.7)
captures the direct impact of a shock in country j on country i. In other words,
if there was a negative shock to U.S. growth, equation (2.7) would measure
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how direct trade linkages transmit this shock to a country such as Singapore
by reducing exports from Singapore to the U.S.
The goal of this paper, however, is also to estimate the indirect multiplier
effect of the shock through output growth in other countries. To do so, it
assumes that output growth in every countries j is not exogenous to output
growth in every other country i. Instead, equation (2.7) considers not only
how slower growth in the U.S. directly affects exports (and therefore growth)
in Singapore, but also how slower growth in the U.S. reduces exports from
China, European Union and other countries, which in turn reduces growth in
these countries and their demand for exports from Singapore. Due to these
indirect multiplier effects, a shock to one country can have a large impact on
other countries that are relatively minor trading partners. Both the direct and
indirect multiplier effect generate the comprehensive interdependency pattern
across the world economies, enhancing the global integration and forming the
world business cycle.
Next, as defined above in equation (2.7), uit captures any omitted variables
not included in trade linkages. These omitted variables are likely to be corre-
lated over time as well as across equations. Instead of trying to model these




D(L)ut = E(L)et (2.8)
where D(L) and E(L) are vector polynomials in the lag operator L of orders
p∗ and q∗, respectively, and et is a vector white noise process with a zero mean
and a diagonal covariance matrix. Using this error structure and rewriting




= Ayft + D(L)
−1E(L)et
= Ayft + (D(L)
∗/ |D(L)|)E(L)et
or
|D(L)| yt = |D(L)|Ayft + vt (2.9)
where A = diag(α1, α2, ..., αn), |D(L)|, and D(L)∗ are the determinant and
adjoint matrices of D(L), respectively, and vt = D(L) ∗ E(L)et is an (n ∗ 1)
vector. Note that every equation of (2.8) has the same autoregressive (AR)
polynomial given by |D(L)|, while each vit follows a separate MA process.
Next, instead of attempting to model vit as an MA process, this serially
correlated process can be approximated by a sufficiently rich AR structure.
This has the additional benefit of relaxing the constraint that each equation of
(2.9) must follow the same AR polynomial. Therefore, equation (2.7) can be
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expressed as an autoregressive distributed lag model with white noise errors:
yit = φ0i + βi(L)y
f
it + φi(L)yit−1 + εit (2.10)
where yfit =
∑n
j=1 wijtyjt, j 6= i, and wijt is the export share from the ith
country to country j,
∑n
j=1 wijt = 1, βi(L) = β1i + β2iL + ... + β(p+1)iL
p and
φi(L) = φ1i + φ2iL + ... + φ(p+1)iL
p, εit is the structure shock.
The entire system of equations is formed by estimating equation (2.10) for
each of the n countries in the the world. Although these n equations appear
to take the form of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), they can also be
expressed as a structural VAR. This structural VAR formulation is useful for
the purpose of estimation, forecasting, impulse response analysis and variance
decomposition analysis. More specifically, if n=3 and p=1, then the system of

















This SVAR can be expressed more compactly as:
(B0 ∙Wt)yt = λ + (B1 ∙Wt−1)yt−1 + εt (2.12)
Where
B0 =
 1 −β01 −β01−β02 1 −β02
−β03 −β03 1
 , B1 =
φ11 β11 β11β12 φ22 β12
β13 β13 φ33
 ,Wt =




and ” ∙ ” indicates the Hadamard product giving the element-wise product of
two matrices.
The general VAR(p) form of (2.11) is:
(B0 ∙Wt)yt = λ + (B1 ∙Wt−1)yt−1 + ... + (Bp ∙Wt−p)yt−p + εt (2.13)
Equation (2.13) constitutes the structural VAR system underlying the main
estimates of the paper.
This method differs from the conventional approach by the following char-
acteristics: First, the method allows one to summarize information from a
large range of countries by imposing an economic structure, instead of adopt-
ing a purely statistical structure. Note that even the lag dynamics are subject
to restrictions. As a result, the model is highly parsimonious. The effective
number of parameters are the same as that of a standard VAR. Second, this
method utilizes economic theory to develop realistic identification restrictions,
avoiding adopting an arbitrary recursive identification scheme as is frequently
done in the VAR literature. Third, Wt is allowed to change over time in (2.13),
which introduces a time-varying parameter structure into the VAR framework.
As a result, impulse response function can be derived before and after a crisis
without having to split the sample into two periods which may render insuffi-
cient observations in many situations.
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Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Analysis
In order to conduct the variance decomposition and the impulse response anal-
ysis, we first fix the export-share weighting matrix (W ) at any desired time
point and rewrite the structural equation (2.13) in the reduced form as: 6
yt = A1yt−1 + A2yt−2 + ... + Ap−1yt−p+1 + Apyt−p + ζt (2.14)
where Ai = (B0 ∙W )−1(Bi ∙W ), i = 1, .., p and ζt = (B0 ∙W )−1εt. Using the
lag operator to represent the dynamics governed by Ai, equation (2.14) yields:
yt = A(L)yt−1 + ζt (2.15)
In order to measure how a shock to one economy affects other economies, we
covert the model into moving-average representation to calculate the impulse
response function:
yt = (I − A(L)L)−1ζt (2.16)







Ci(B0 ∙W )−1εt−i (2.17)
where the Ci matrices are computed from the recursive relationship:
C0 = I, Ci =
i∑
j=1
Ci−jAj , i = 1, 2, ... (2.18)
6We remove the constant term in the variance decomposition and impulse response anal-
ysis since it does not affect the results.
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and I is the identity matrix.
Now the growth series yt for each economy is represented by the current
and lagged structural shocks εt. The impulse responses and variance decom-
positions based on (2.16) or (2.17) can be viewed as the large-scale version of
impulse responses and variance decompositions of conventional VAR model,
also with the restricted and time-varying coefficients.
Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
The confidence intervals on the impulse response functions are estimated with
the ‘bootstrap after bootstrap’ procedure that Kilian (1998) introduced.7 To
illustrate how to incorporate this method in our paper, consider equation (2.16)
and (2.17) and let θ(A(L)) denote the impulse response function. For boot-
strapping, we re-estimate the B matrix contained in A(L). Kilian’s procedure
involve a small-sample bias correction. The basic steps are as follows:
1. Estimate the Aˆ(L), εˆt by OLS as shown in equation (2.13) and (2.14).
2. Compute a bias correction for Aˆ(L), i.e.




7 Kilian (1998) proves that this procedure is asymptotically valid. He also gives some
simulation evidence of its finite sample performance. In his simulations, the bootstrap after
bootstrap confidence intervals of impulse responses are better than the traditional bootstrap
intervals and those based on the asymptotic distribution.
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(b) Estimate Aˆ∗b(L) by OLS using y
∗
t,b.






3. Apply the bias correction to form A˜(L), by preserving stationarity
(a) If a root of det(Aˆ(z)) is inside the unit circle (nonstationary), let
A˜(L) = Aˆ(L).
(b) If all roots of det(Aˆ(z)) are outside the unit circle (stationary), let
A˜(L) = Aˆ(L) − Ψˆ(1 − δ)j , where j is the minimal non-negative
integer such that all the roots of det(A˜(L)) are outside the unit
circle.
4. Bootstrap A˜(L) and θ(Aˆ(L))





(c) Bias correct as above to form ˜˜A∗b(L). This would lead to a nested,
bootstrap within a bootstrap.
(d) Compute θ∗b (
˜˜A∗b(L)).
(e) Use quantiles of θ∗b (
˜˜A∗b(L)) to form a confidence intervals.
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In this paper, we set number of replications B = 2000 to construct the biased-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the impulse response function.
2.2.3 Dynamic Factor Model and the World Business
Cycle
Since the seminal work of Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), the dynamic fac-
tor model (Stock and Watson, 2002; Bai and Ng, 2002) has become a popular
approach in analyzing international business cycles (e.g. Stock and Watson,
2005a; Eickmeier, 2007; Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2008; Kose, Otrok and
Prasad, 2012). Dynamic factor models are the dynamic counterparts to static
unobserved factor models that are common in psychology and other social sci-
ences. A static factor model provides a description of the variance covariance
matrix of a set of random variables, while a dynamic factor model provides
a description of the spectral density matrix of a set of time series. Thus the
dynamic factor(s) describe contemporaneous and temporal covariation among
the variables.
The premise of a dynamic factor model is that a few latent dynamic factors,
ft, drive the comovements of a high-dimensional vector of time-series variables,
yt, which is also affected by a vector of mean-zero idiosyncratic disturbances,
et.
8 These idiosyncratic disturbances arise from measurement error and from
8The observable variables yt are mean-adjusted and rescaled to have variance one before
estimation.
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special features that are specific to an individual series. The latent factors
follow a time series process, which is commonly taken to be a VAR process.
The general formulation of dynamic factor model is given by,
yt = λ(L)ft + et (2.19)
ft = Ψ(L)ft−1 + ηt (2.20)
where there are n series, so yt and et are n × 1, there are q dynamic factors
so ft and ηt are q × 1, L is the lag operator, and the lag polynomial matrices
λ(L) and Ψ(L) are n× q and q× q, respectively. The ith lag polynomial λi(L)
is called the dynamic factor loading for ith series, yit, and λi(L)ft is called
common component of the ith series. Typically the errors et are assumed to
follow univariate autoregressions,
di(L)eit = vit, (2.21)
with the further assumptions that vit is i.i.d N (0, σ
2
vi
). In estimation, we
approximate these serial correlation by adding the lags of yt into the equation
(2.19), which yields
yt = λ(L)ft + D(L)yt−1 + vt (2.22)
where,
D(L) =




and δi(L) governs the auto-correlation of each series, yit. Note that the i
th
equation of (2.23) has the form
yit = δ0i + λi(L)ft + δi(L)yt−1 + vit (2.24)
The dynamic factor model consists of equation (2.22) and an equation
describing the evolution of the factors. The model can be written in a VAR


















In our exercise, yt represent the growth series of each country. The unob-
served factors are thought to characterize the temporal comovements in the
cross-country panel. Following Stock and Watson (2005a), we extract dynamic
factors using the principal components method. We extract one single factor
which drives most of the comovement of the countries, and interpret it as the
world business cycle. We also extract group specific factors to capture the
common dynamic property within some particular country groups.9 Thus for
country i:








t + δi(L)yit−1 + vit (2.26)
and i = 1, ..., n denotes the country number, δi(L) = δ1i + δ2iL+ ...+ δ(p+1)iL
p.
The coefficients λwi and λ
g
i are the factor loadings, and reflect the degree to
9The procedure draws the group factor conditional on the world factor. This imposes
orthogonality between the world and group factor innovations. For more details, see Kose,
Otrok and Prasad (2012).
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which variation in yit can be explained by world factor (f
w
t ) and group factor





















It is now worth highlighting some similarities between the trade-linked
SVAR and the factor VAR. First, if there is only one world factor then equa-
tions (2.10) and (2.26) look similar except the way in which yf and fw are
constructed. Both are weighted sums of individual growth rates. In yf weights
are the observed trade shares and in fw weights are extracted statistically us-
ing the principal components method. A subtle difference here is that in yf
the country i is excluded whereas in fw all the countries are included gen-
erally.11 Second, although we include a world factor and a group factor in
(2.26), this is analogous to the foreign component with time varying weighting
scheme in the SVAR model. Third, if the trade-linked SVAR and the factor
VAR produce similar results then we know that trade links are the source of
the transmission mechanism and thus provide an economic foundation to the
10Note that, we assume the factors can have only the contemporaneous impact on each
country and let the factor equation (2.27) to capture the dynamics of the factors. This
is called the static form of dynamic factor model, and the general form of dynamic factor
model in equation (2.25) can be rewritten in this way. For more details, see Stock and
Watson (2005a, 2011).
11In a regression context this renders an undesirable property to the factor model espe-
cially when a large economy like the U.S. is related to the factor, which also includes the
U.S.
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factor VAR model, which otherwise remains subject to subjective interpreta-
tions. Fourth, it should also be noted that identifying a factor as the world
factor requires subjective judgment with regard to the magnitude and the sign
of factor loadings. Negative factor loadings need to be ignored. This problem
does not arise in the trade-linked SVAR model.
Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Analysis
Analogous to the structural VAR analysis, we covert the model into MA rep-
resentation to conduct the variance decomposition analysis and calculate the
impulse responses function. Based on the law of motion we define in equation
(2.27), dynamic factor innovations ηt are linearly uncorrelated:
E(ηtη
′
t) = Ω (2.28)
where Ω is a 2 ∗ 2 diagonal matrix (one world factor and one group factor) for
each country i.
We convert the dynamic factor model into the MA representation:
yt = C
∗(L)B∗(L)ηt + C∗(L)vt (2.29)
where B∗(L) = λ[I − ψ(L)L]−1, and C∗(L) = [I − D(L)L]−1. The moving
average lag polynomial C∗(L)B∗(L) is the impulse response function with re-
spect to the structural shocks ηt; This is the primary interest in the structural
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dynamic factor model analysis. The impulse responses and variance decom-
positions based on (2.29) can be thought of as the factor version of impulse
responses and variance decompositions with respect to Cholesky factorizations
of conventional VAR innovations.
2.2.4 Data
Although the trade-linked SVAR model presented above for each country
only includes two sets of variables (output growth and trade-weighted out-
put growth of the trading partners), compiling consistent time series for a
sample of countries including the developing countries is not trivial. This sec-
tion summarizes the key characteristics of this data set, and the Appendix
describes sources and the compilation process in detail.
The quarterly data set used to estimate the primary results includes 60
economies and the rest of the world, for the period running from 1985:1 to
2013:4. The choice of the starting date reflects our desire to maximize the
sample length while considering as a large number of countries as possible. In
addition, we are particularly interested in this period because it is the era when
the remarkable globalization process takes place (Kose, Otrok and Prasad,
2012). The country set contains not only most of the industrial countries and
emerging market economies, but also includes the major developing countries
that are rapidly integrating into the world economy. Totally, they account
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for 89 percent of world GDP in 2013. We further construct a rest of world
(ROW) series as a control. The ROW series includes all members of the world
except the 60 countries in our data set. As a result, the final data set consists
of 61 series of real GDP growth rates and 3600 series of export shares, each
compiled on a quarterly basis from 1985 through 2013.
We use first differences of log real GDP to represent the growth rates and
utilize data on merchandise exports between countries to measure bilateral-
trade flows. Next, we calculate the export-share matrix (W ) as a 12-quarter
moving average of export shares. This strategy allows the export-share matrix
to vary smoothly over time. Although a constant export-share matrix (W )
would facilitate estimation and forecasting, this is not realistic since trade
patterns change significantly over the long time period under consideration.
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Estimation
This section uses the data described above to estimate the trade-linked SVAR
model. After a preliminary analysis of residual autocorrelations, we set p = 2.
Hence, there are 11163 VAR coefficients in (2.13), but only 366 coefficients
need to be estimated in the SVAR system. We use ordinary least squares
(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the model and find
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similar results under each estimation procedure. The 2SLS standard errors
were also roughly the same as the OLS standard errors.12 To conserve space,
we concentrate on the results from OLS estimates.
Table 2.1 Panel A reports the contemporaneous pairwise correlation ma-
trix of quarterly GDP growth series among 16 representative economies in our
sample. They are the major economies of different regions. The bold val-
ues indicate the statistical significance of Pearson correlation coefficient at the
5% level. Panel A documents 46 out of 120 bold values (38%) of significant
pairwise correlations. It indicates the strong cross-border interactions among
these economies. Moving to the full sample, we document that the average
correlation coefficient is 0.1036 over the 61 economies, with 26.4% significant
pairwise correlations at the 5% level. Besides, the magnitudes of these pairwise
correlations are generally very large, implying the deep cross-country interde-
pendence. For example, the correlation coefficient is 0.58 between English-
speaking countries the U.S. and the U.K., and is 0.40 between France and
Germany. The key message delivered by this simple correlation analysis is
that the world economies are highly integrated.
Table 2.1 Panel B presents pairwise correlation matrix of the residual series
12We utilize four lags, yit−3, ..., yit−6, of each yit as instruments. In other words, we
use lagged values of the growth rates for all the economies in the sample as instruments.
It is worth emphasizing that this approach is only possible due to the assumption in the
structural model that the growth rates in all countries except i are included as a single
trade-weighted aggregate variable and not as separate explanatory variables.
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Table 2.1: Pairwise Correlation across Countries, 1985-2013
France Germany UK Canada Mexico US Australia China India Japan Malaysia Singapore Argentina Brazil Nigeria Kenya
France 1.00
Germany 0.40 1.00
UK 0.47 0.16 1.00
Canada 0.47 -0.04 0.52 1.00
Mexico 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.30 1.00
US 0.45 0.10 0.55 0.58 0.31 1.00
Australia 0.04 -0.18 0.34 0.27 0.01 0.22 1.00
China -0.04 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.12 1.00
India 0.17 -0.19 0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 1.00
Japan 0.43 0.30 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.33 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 1.00
Malaysia 0.33 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.18 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 0.35 1.00
Singapore 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.04 0.22 -0.04 0.28 0.57 1.00
Argentina 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.25 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 1.00
Brazil 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.34 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.14 -0.15 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.17 1.00
Nigeria 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.07 -0.06 0.16 -0.11 0.09 0.32 0.19 0.12 0.30 1.00
Kenya 0.13 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.14 1.00
France Germany UK Canada Mexico US Australia China India Japan Malaysia Singapore Argentina Brazil Nigeria Kenya
France 1.00
Germany 0.21 1.00
UK 0.05 0.05 1.00
Canada -0.02 -0.29 0.06 1.00
Mexico 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.09 1.00
US 0.01 -0.11 0.20 0.24 0.11 1.00
Australia -0.16 -0.26 0.19 0.24 0.01 0.14 1.00
China -0.15 0.03 0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.13 0.04 1.00
India 0.18 -0.20 0.21 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.12 -0.08 1.00
Japan 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.19 -0.11 1.00
Malaysia 0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.06 -0.05 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.08 1.00
Singapore 0.03 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.03 0.25 1.00
Argentina -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 0.02 -0.11 -0.11 0.14 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 1.00
Brazil -0.44 -0.02 -0.19 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 1.00
Nigeria -0.23 -0.08 -0.28 0.08 -0.01 -0.20 -0.19 0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.21 0.06 0.27 1.00
Kenya 0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.14 -0.05 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 1.00
France Germany UK Canada Mexico US Australia China India Japan Malaysia Singapore Argentina Brazil Nigeria Kenya
France 1.00
Germany -0.04 1.00
UK 0.02 -0.03 1.00
Canada 0.03 -0.28 0.03 1.00
Mexico -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.04 1.00
US 0.04 -0.11 0.17 -0.11 -0.17 1.00
Australia -0.10 -0.27 0.20 0.16 -0.05 0.13 1.00
China -0.15 0.04 0.13 0.12 -0.03 0.14 0.07 1.00
India 0.22 -0.22 0.23 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.04 1.00
Japan 0.09 0.12 0.07 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.24 -0.12 1.00
Malaysia 0.12 -0.02 -0.21 0.01 0.00 -0.19 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
Singapore 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.19 1.00
Argentina 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.05 -0.05 -0.11 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 1.00
Brazil -0.36 -0.03 -0.13 0.22 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.24 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.20 1.00
Nigeria -0.21 -0.07 -0.28 0.18 0.09 -0.32 -0.17 0.06 -0.09 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 0.06 0.24 1.00
Kenya 0.12 -0.03 0.05 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.04 0.14 -0.03 -0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.01 1.00
France Germany UK Canada Mexico US Australia China India Japan Malaysia Singapore Argentina Brazil Nigeria Kenya
France 1.00
Germany 0.14 1.00
UK -0.11 -0.09 1.00
Canada -0.11 -0.40 0.05 1.00
Mexico -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 1.00
US -0.15 -0.26 0.12 0.21 0.11 1.00
Australia -0.25 -0.33 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.13 1.00
China -0.17 0.04 0.17 0.09 -0.04 0.14 0.06 1.00
India 0.21 -0.19 0.26 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.13 -0.07 1.00
Japan 0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.19 -0.09 1.00
Malaysia 0.19 0.01 -0.16 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.16 0.02 0.07 1.00
Singapore 0.03 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
Argentina 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.13 0.05 0.02 -0.11 -0.06 1.00
Brazil -0.39 0.02 -0.14 0.18 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.24 -0.06 -0.19 -0.21 0.01 1.00
Nigeria -0.12 0.06 -0.16 0.16 0.00 -0.09 -0.13 0.03 -0.14 0.04 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 0.29 1.00
Kenya 0.11 0.02 0.07 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.02 -0.10 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.17 1.00
Note: Bold values indicate significant at the 5% level.
Table 1. Pairwise Correlation across Countries (1985-2013)
Panel A. Correlation of Growth Series
Panel B. Correlation of Residuals of SVAR
Panel C.  Correlatrion of Residuals of Dynamic Factor Model, with One Single World Factor
Panel D.  Correlatrion of Residuals of Dynamic Factor Model, with  both  World  and Group Factors
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after we fit the trade-linked SVAR model. It shows that the SVAR model cap-
tures most of the business cycle comovements of these countries. The number
of significant cross-country correlations reduce from 46 to 18. Besides, most
of the values are only significant marginally. At the 1% significance level,
only 5 out of 120 remain significant. Considering the full sample, the aver-
age correlation drops sharply from 0.1036 to 0.0072. This implies that the
SVAR model is effective in summarizing the information and capturing the
common dynamics across the countries. To further check the diagonality of
the residual-correlation matrix, we examine the significance of each correlation
coefficient. Over the full sample, we document that 9.6% of the correlation
coefficients remain statistically significant at the 5% level and 4.2% at the
1% level. It generally supports the diagonality of the residual correlation ma-
trix. Therefore, we don’t have to impose any further restrictions for structural
analysis.
For comparison with the common dynamic properties captured by the
world business cycle, we employ the same GDP growth data to re-estimate
the dynamic factor model. We set the order of auto-regression to 2, as in the
SVAR method.13 Following Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), we interpret
13We further calculate the information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) to select
the number of factors. None of their six criteria favored increasing the number of world
factors from 1 to 2.
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this single common factor as the world common factor, or the world business
cycle.14 Table 2.1 Panel C reports pairwise correlation matrix of the resid-
ual series after we extract one single world business cycle component. Again,
the bold values indicate the statistical significance of the Pearson correlation
coefficient at the 5% level. Panel C also shows a remarkable reduction of cross-
border correlations and 18 correlations are statistically significant. In the full
sample, we document 11.2% significant correlations at the 5% level and 5.0%
at the 1% level, with an average value of -0.0125. The results show that both
the SVAR model and DFM are effective and can capture the cross-country
interdependence in a similar manner. Further investigation of the relationship
between Panel B and Panel C delivers some other interesting observations.
For most of the remaining significant entries, the residual correlation matrices
based on these two approaches perform in a similar manner. For instance,
we document similar -0.36 and -0.44 residual correlations between France and
Brazil, and similar -0.28 and -0.29 residual correlations between Canada and
Germany. It may suggest that the remaining significant correlations may come
from statistical artifacts.
Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2012) also document that, in the globalization
period (since 1985), another common factor, the group factor, plays an im-
14Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) and Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2012) employ a
Bayesian approach to estimate the model.
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portant role in explaining the international dimension of the business cycle.
In this study, we document the 0.2474 correlation of growth rates within the
industrial countries, 0.1207 within the emerging markets and 0.0884 within
developing counties. Compared to 0.0795 across the country groups, we also
confirm the importance of these group factors. As a result, we also incorpo-
rate these group factors in our study.15 Panel D presents pairwise correlation
matrix of the residual series after we extract these group factors, as well as one
single world business cycle component. It shows that the number of significant
residual correlations further drops to 16. Moving to the full sample, there is
8.7% significant correlation at the 5% level and 3.8% at the 1% level. These
empirical evidence stay in line with the findings in Kose, Otrok and Prasad
(2012), addressing the importance to capturing these commonalities within
the country groups.
2.3.2 Variance Decomposition
As stated earlier, Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) adopt a dynamic factor
model to analyze interdependence across countries. They find a common world
factor is an important source of volatility for aggregates in most countries,
providing evidence for a world business cycle. In this section, we measure
15The 60 economies are divided into three country groups: industrial, emerging and de-
veloping. For more details, see Appendix.
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Figure 2.1: The International Components for Selected Countries
Note:  The dotted line refers to the trade-weighted international components estimated by the SVAR method. The solid line refers to the international component estimated by
the dynamic factor model (DFM) with one single world factor. The SVAR series has been demeaned and standardized to match the DFM series.
Figure 1. The International Components for Selected Countries 
Figure 1. Estimated International Components for Selected Countries 
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the relative contributions of the international component and country-specific
component to the GDP growth fluctuations in each country, based on the
international transmission mechanism estimated by the trade-linked Structural
VAR model. We then compare the results with common dynamic properties
of the world business cycle, which are estimated by the dynamic factor model.
Before assessing to the variance decomposition analysis, it is useful to start
with plotting the dynamics of international components for some representa-
tive economies based on the two approaches. For illustration, Figure 2.1 graphs
the international components for three major economies, the U.S., Germany,
China and one small open economy, Singapore. We denote the international
components estimated by SVAR as Foreign factor, and the international com-
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ponents estimated by the DFM with one single factor as World factor.16 It
is worth highliting that the trade-weighted Foreign factor closely tracks the
model-based World factor. This is an indication that the two methods are
after all not very different.
To assess more general dynamic properties, we present variance decomposi-
tion results in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2. All the results are based on 24-quarter
horizon. Again the Foreign refers to the fraction that can be attributed to the
international components estimated by the SVAR model (the international
transmission mechanism). The World and World +Group refer to the fraction
that can be attributed to the international components estimated by the DFM
with one single world factor and world and group factors. The Domestic refers
to the fraction of national business cycle that can be explained by the domestic
components in both two models.
We first focus on the international transmission mechanism revealed by
the trade-linked SVAR system. Table 2.2 Panel A documents the dynamic
properties of international components and domestic components in explaining
the variation of each economy. The empirical results show that, for most of
countries, the domestic components play an important role in driving their
business cycles. The domestic components, on average, can explain 72% of
16We use this terminology to reflect the fact that the World factor includes all the countries
whereas Foreign factor excludes the country of concern.
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output variations over the 61 economies. Looking across the countries, it is
evident that as countries become more developed (For example, G7 countries),
the international components appear to become more relevant in explaining
their national business cycles. In general, the emerging markets are more
domestic driven. For the two fast-growing emerging countries, China and
India, the international components only account for 6% and 5% of fluctuations
in these economies. However, there are also some exceptions. Singapore and
Malaysia are highly affected by the international economy conditions. This
reflects the open economy status of these countries.
Now we compare the results above with the world business cycles cap-
tured by dynamic factor model. Panel B reports the variance decomposition
from DFM based on one world factor. One interesting result is that Panel B
delivers similar domestic and international pattern. Compared to the SVAR
model, the absolute difference of the fraction that can be explained by the
international components is 0.13 across the 61 economies. This implies that
the international transmission mechanism estimated by the SVAR model can
largely capture the dynamics of the world business cycle. It is worthy to
note that, for most countries, the proportion explained by the world factor
is smaller in Panel B. This indicates that one single world factor is generally
not sufficient to capture all the external impact on the national business cycle.
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Figure 2.2: Variance Decomposition by SVAR and DFM for Selected
Economies
Note:   World refers to the fraction of GDP growth variations that can be explained by one single world common factor. World+Group refers to the world and group common factors.
Foregin refers to the fraction that can be explained by the international components estimated in the SVAR system.
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The commonality across economies is also driven by the comovement within
different groups (Kose, Otrok and Prasad, 2012). Panel C further tabulates
the variance decomposition with both one single world business cycle and the
group common factor. After we extract the group common factor, the abso-
lute difference further drops to 0.09 across the 61 economies. Therefore, in the
following comparison, we limit our attention on the world business cycle with
group factors.
Figure 2.2 presents a clearer pattern of the relationship between the dy-
namic properties captured by the international transmission mechanism and
the world business cycle, by plotting the fraction of international components
of each economy into the histogram. Figure 2.2 shows a similar structure of
degree of interdependence for different types of countries. In both approaches,
we document that the small open economies are likely to be heavily affected
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by the international components. In addition, China, India and Australia are
the most isolated economies. On average, roughly 30% of the fluctuations of
growth in each country can be explained by the international components.
In conclusion, the empirical analysis above indicate that the international
transmission mechanism we trace out can largely capture the common dy-
namic properties of business cycle fluctuations in the world. It provides a
potential international transmission foundation for the world business cycle.
Furthermore, since the trade-linked SVAR model explicitly identify the global
interdependency structure across the countries, we may further locate all the
main channels of interactions among world major economies and trace out the
dynamic response of one economy to another.
The possible reasons for the remaining difference come from three parts:
First, the two models adopt different definitions of international compo-
nents. For example, the commonality of business cycle fluctuations in indus-
trial countries maybe driven by a domestic shock in an influential economy
such as the U.S. In the SVAR model, we explicitly capture this international
transmission mechanism and interpret it as the domestic effect for the U.S.
and international effect for the rest of countries. However, the factor approach
simply captures comovement across the countries, and as a result, explains it
as the external common effect. In a regression context, this renders an unde-
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sirable property to the factor model especially when a large economy like the
U.S. is related to the factor, which also includes the U.S.
Second, the common business cycle may also be attributed to the move-
ment of international commodity prices, for example, the fluctuations of oil
price. Although we do not model this explicitly, it is worth pointing out that,
since our sample contains a large range of countries, including both inter-
national commodity exporters and importers, changing of international com-
modity prices are unlikely to trigger the comovement of growth in our country
set.17
Third, trade linkages alone may fail to capture the cross-country interac-
tions. However, trade linkages are shown to be adequate to approximate a
significant fraction of cross-country linkages discussed in the literature.
2.3.3 International Transmission Mechanism
What is of key interest in general is unravelling the international transmis-
sion of national macroeconomic movements; That is, to examine the pattern
of dynamic responses of each of the sixty-one economies to one unit growth
innovation in a particular economy. The factor model is not very amenable for
17A change of international commodity price is redistributive. Windfall gains of the
exporters is the income losses of the importers.
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this purpose. We, therefore, use only the trade-linked SVAR model for this
purpose. Although we can trace out the dynamic interdependency structure
across all the economies in our sample, we report two events that researchers
and policy makers care most about: a positive shock (recovery) in the U.S.
economy and a negative shock (slowdown) in China’s economy. Note that
the international transmission mechanism is subject to the time-varying trade
share matrix Wt, which reflects the changing properties of the global economic
landscape.18 In this section, we focus on a more recent period, generating the
impulse responses based on the trade share matrix of the second quarter of
2013 to shed light on the current issues.
International Impact of a U.S. Shock
It used to be said that when the U.S. sneezed, the world economy caught a cold.
Is this still true? In this section, we provide recent evidence to quantitatively
answer this question and further investigate the international impact of the
recovery of the U.S. economy.
Figure 2.3 graphs the impulse responses of world major economies to one
unit positive growth shock in the U.S. economy, along with the 95% confidence
interval bands from bootstrapping. As expected, the development of the U.S.
18For example, the world economy is more likely to be affected by the fluctuations of
China’s economy, compared to thirty years ago. We will further discuss this issue in the
section 2.3.5.
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economy generates a significant expansion in world real activities and, there-
after, these responses gradually taper off. It shows that the U.S. is still the
most influential economy in the world. Taking the European countries’ re-
sponses as an example, Figure 2.3 shows that Germany’s response to one unit
U.S. shock is 0.16 in the first period, followed by 0.36 in the second period
and 0.15 in the third period. France, the U.K. and Italy respond to one unit
U.S. shock in an almost identical fashion. The impulse responses of them are
roughly 0.20, followed by a slow decline in the later ten quarters. These re-
sults are consistent with the observations of the recent recession happens in
the European economies that was triggered by the subprime crisis initiated in
the U.S. financial market.
Further examination of Figure 2.3 reveals some other interesting patterns.
Canada, the U.S. and Mexico constitute the North American Region. Kose,
Otrok and Whiteman (2003) argue that the regional common factor plays
an important role among these countries. Our empirical results also provide
evidence to confirm this regional effect. For instance, Canada reacts to the
U.S. shock by 0.44 instantly, dying off slowly within the following ten quarters.
There is, even more, regional integration between the U.S. and Mexico. One
unit shock in the U.S. triggers 0.70 contemporaneous movement of Mexico,
resulting from strong links between these two countries.
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We then investigate the interaction between the U.S. and East Asian emerg-
ing markets, which are the most vigorous economies in recent years. Figure
2.3 shows that the movement of the U.S. economy profoundly affects the small
open economies, e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore. More than 0.47 unit impulse
response indicates that these economies are highly sensitive to the interna-
tional innovations. On the contrary, the impact on the growth of China’s
economy seems to be relatively more moderate compared to these markets.
One unit U.S. shock will generate only around 0.15 expansion for the China’s
economy. This muted effect may be attributed to the fiscal policy and mon-
etary policy that the China’s government often adopts to offset the negative
impact of international shocks on China.
We now focus on the other major economies in the world. The U.S. is the
major raw material importer from South America. Considering Brazil, the
largest economy in South America, one unit expansion of the U.S. triggers
0.34 increase of Brazil economy in the same quarter. This dynamic impact
will gradually pass away in the following ten periods. For the world largest oil
exporter, Saudi Arabia, the contemporaneous response of one unit U.S. shock
is profound, which is 1.25. It reflects the status that the U.S. economy is the
number one exporting partner of Saudi Arabia, and it plays the role as the
engine of world growth. However, moving to India and Australia, the dynamic
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impacts of the expansion of U.S. are relatively modest. The domestic compo-
nents and international linkages with other countries govern the fluctuations
of these countries.
International Impact of a China’s Shock
It is also of interest to examine the impacts of a slowdown in China’s growth
on the world economies. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China has
notably emerged as one of the twin engines of global growth. Nevertheless,
recent deceleration of China’s economy makes the world increasingly worried
about future global instability, which may further drag the world growth. The
underlying concern is undoubtedly how this slowdown of the China’s economy
will affect the rest of the world. In this paper, we attempt to answer the
question above by carefully investigating dynamic interdependency structure
between China and world major economies.
Figure 2.4 plots the impulse response patterns to some selected countries,
when there is one unit negative growth shock in China. As we can see, all
economies show a significant contemporaneous response to a crash in China’s
market, suggesting an important role the Chinese market is playing in the
world. Focusing on the Asian emerging markets, they suffer a severe con-
traction from a slump in China’s demand. For instance, the contemporaneous
impulse response of Hong Kong to China’s shock is 0.86, which is subsequently
88




























































































































































































































































































































































































































dying off in the four periods. The regional effect has again been confirmed by
investigating the interdependence between China and Asian countries. For
example, one unit shock in China may, on average, lead to 0.44 response of
ASEAN-5 economies. The empirical results above caution the policy makers
in Asian emerging markets to a better policy preparation for the potential
impact of falling demand from the China’s market.
Moving to the industrial countries, the impulse response to a China’s shock
is relatively modest but still significant. One unit China’s demand shock is
accompanied by a decline in the U.S. GDP growth around 0.13 on impact, fol-
lowed by 0.09 on first quarter and 0.05 on the second quarter. Similarly results
can be drawn for the European markets. For France, the United Kingdom and
Italy, one unit decrease of China’s economy will lead to, on average, 0.12 slump
in these economies, followed by smoothly dying off in the subsequent periods.
The instant impulse response of Germany to a China’s shock is 0.10, followed
by 0.22 on the second period and 0.07 on the third period.
As the world’s largest oil importer, the slowdown of China’s economy trig-
gers an additional downside pressure and instability of oil price. For the major
oil exporting country, Saudi Arabia, the slowdown of China’s economy gener-
ates 0.95 decrease of its growth on impact. Meanwhile, China is also playing
the role as the biggest raw material exporting partner of Africa. This status
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is reflected by the dynamic response patterns of Nigeria, the largest economy
and major oil exporting country in Africa: The instant effect of the China’s
slowdown on Nigeria is 0.60, and then it fluctuates and shrinks to zero in the
following four periods.
2.3.4 Direct and Indirect Effect
Why do the fluctuations of one influential economy, e.g. the U.S. or China,
would have such a profound impact on the world, affecting the economies even
with few direct trade and financial links with it? This is what was happening
in the recent 2008 financial crisis originated in the U.S. housing market, and
almost all the crisis that rapidly spread across the world. To answer this
question, we decompose the international impact of a national shock into two
components: direct bilateral effect and indirect multiplier effect.
When a shock takes place in one economy, trade and financial linkage will
transmit this shock to other economies mainly through two channels: direct
bilateral effect and indirect multiplier effect. The direct bilateral effect refers
to the impact of one economy on another by the direct bilateral linkage be-
tween these countries. The indirect multiplier effect refers to the impact of
one economy on another through its impact on output and growth in other
economies. For example, the slower growth in the U.S. reduces exports in
Singapore, which directly affects the growth of Singapore. On the other hand,
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this slower growth in the U.S. also reduces exports from China, the European
Union and other countries, which in turn reduces growth in these countries
and their demand for exports from Singapore. This further indirectly drags
the growth of Singapore. Due to these indirect multiplier effects, a shock to
one country can have a large impact on other countries that are relatively
minor trading or financial partners. The direct bilateral effect, along with the
indirect multiplier effect, generate the comprehensive international transmis-
sion pattern across the world economies, enhancing the global integration and
forming the world business cycle.
In this section, we aim to quantitatively measure the magnitude of both
direct and indirect effects. We argue that the indirect multiplier effect can
explain a significant fraction of the global effects of a national shock. Based
on that, we point out the potential weakness of single equation approach,
even the small-scale model, in investigating the interdependence across differ-
ent economies. To facilitate the explanation, we limit the empirics as in the
pervious context, to one unit expansion of the U.S. economy.
Figure 2.5 plots the accumulated response of some representative economies.
The solid line, indicated as Total, represents the total impact on the corre-
sponding country. This is simply the sum of the impulse response function in
Figure 2.3. The dotted line, denoted as Direct, shows the direct bilateral effect
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Figure 2.5: Direct and Indirect Effect of One Unit Expansion of the US Econ-
omy
Figure 5. Direct and Indirect Effect of One Unit Expansion of the US Economy
Note:The solid line, denoted as Total, represents the total impact on the corresponding countries, given a U.S. shock. The dottted line, denoted as
Direct,  shows the direct bilateral effect, which is estimated by shutting down the external channel. The dash line, named as Indirect, measures the





































































Table 2.3: Direct and Indirect Effect of One Unit Expansion of the US Econ-
omy
Finland France Germany Italy Spain Switzerland UK Canada Mexico US 
Total 1.85 0.74 0.76 1.04 0.99 0.75 0.49 2.10 2.28 2.52
Direct 13% 10% 12% 12% 7% 19% 18% 66% 66% 72%
Indirect 87% 90% 88% 88% 93% 81% 82% 34% 34% 28%
Australia Hong Kong China India Japan Korea Saudi Arabia Singapore Brazil Average 
Total 0.12 0.99 0.31 0.40 1.11 0.36 1.55 1.74 1.05 0.73
Direct 9% 25% 27% 19% 27% 19% 24% 11% 19% 18%
Indirect 91% 75% 73% 81% 73% 81% 76% 89% 81% 82%
Note: Total represents the total accumulated impact on the corresponding countries.  Direct and Indirect report the fraction of this total impact that
can be attributed to the direct bilateral effect and indirect multiplier effect respectively.
on the corresponding country. It is estimated by shutting down the external
channels in our international transmission system. The dash line, named as
Indirect, measures the indirect multiplier effect, the part of impact beyond the
direct interaction.
Figure 2.5 delivers some interesting observations: First, the accumulated
response results on the U.S. itself illustrates the mechanism of how the indirect
multiplier effect works. When one unit positive shock takes place in the U.S.,
this expansion of the U.S. economy will boost other economies, which in turn
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triggers further development of the U.S. economy. This indirect multiplier
impact is explicitly shown by the dash line in the first subplot of Figure 2.6.
It indicates that, because of the indirect multiplier effect, one unit positive
structural shock in the U.S. leads to more than one unit growth in the U.S.
economy within a quarter. More specifically, one unit shock will produce
roughly 0.20 further growth through the indirect multiplier channel instantly.
Second, considering the international transmission of the U.S. shock, the
accumulated responses of other countries imply that the indirect multiplier ef-
fect plays a vital role in explaining the international impact of national shocks.
For Canada and Mexico, the indirect effect is relatively moderate because of
the strong direct trade and financial linkages between them and the U.S. How-
ever, for the other economies, the indirect effect is much stronger, and can
explain a substantial fraction of total impact.
To put the graphical pattern of into a numerical perspective, we tabulate
the long-run total accumulated effect, along with the proportion of direct and
indirect components, in Table 2.5. Table 2.5 shows that the average total ac-
cumulated impact of one unit shock in the U.S. is 0.73 across the 61 economies
in our country set, 18 percent of which comes from the direct effect and 82 per-
cent comes from the indirect effect. This indicates that the indirect multiplier
effect plays an important role in the international transmission of national fluc-
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tuations, and explains why a shock initiated in one single country can trigger
substantial effects all over the world. In addition, the strong bilateral direct
linkages are not always associated with huge total accumulated effect. For
instance, the small open economy of Singapore is heavily influenced by the
international shocks. The accumulated impact of one unit U.S. shock is 1.74.
However, the direct effect only account for 11 percent of this total impact.
It suggests that the fluctuation of the U.S. economy affects Singapore mainly
through its impacts on other economies. It further draws attentions to the im-
portance of capturing both the direct bilateral impact and indirect multiplier
impact in investigating the international interdependency structure across the
countries. Based on that, we address the potential weakness of constructing a
small-scale model for investigating international transmission mechanism. It
may underestimate the indirect multiplier effect by unfairly shutting down the
some cross-country channels. This weakness may be severe since not only the
industrial countries, but also emerging and developing countries, are highly
involved in the globalization process in the recent thirty years.
2.3.5 Time-varying Nature of International Transmis-
sion Mechanism
The world economic landscape has shifted dramatically since the mid-1980s.
One stylized fact is the rise of the emerging market economies (EMEs). The
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1996 2013 1996 2013 1996 2013 1996 2013
France 1.24 0.74 0.21 0.47 0.29 0.16 0.66 0.48
Germany 1.31 0.76 0.22 0.49 0.31 0.15 1.68 1.50
UK 0.79 0.49 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.35 0.25
Canada 2.73 2.10 0.21 0.46 0.35 0.16 0.38 0.24
Mexico 2.87 2.28 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.15 0.39 0.25
US 2.95 2.52 0.17 0.36 0.28 0.13 0.32 0.20
Australia 0.27 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.04
China 0.54 0.31 1.60 1.67 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.10
India 0.72 0.40 0.12 0.27 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.15
Japan 2.21 1.11 0.39 0.88 1.55 1.33 0.60 0.33
Malaysia 3.94 1.73 0.69 1.45 1.04 0.56 1.09 0.59
Singapore 4.09 1.74 0.74 1.55 1.03 0.50 1.15 0.62
Argentina 2.46 1.30 0.40 0.93 0.57 0.27 0.88 0.52
Brazil 2.03 1.05 0.31 0.80 0.46 0.22 0.66 0.40
Nigeria 2.99 1.96 0.31 0.71 0.47 0.26 0.85 0.55
Kenya 0.84 0.50 0.14 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.40 0.24
Average 1.30 0.73 0.24 0.49 0.32 0.17 0.50 0.33
Table 4. Timg-varying International Accumulated Impacts of One Unit Shock in Four Engines of Growth 
US China Japan Germany
EMEs have become major players and now account for about a quarter of
world output and a large share of global growth. Besides, the world economy
has also experienced a steady increase of trade and financial linkages across
countries. These developments lead to a question of considerable interest that
how the shift of the global economic landscape would affect the international
transmission mechanism across countries.
In this section, we investigate this time-varying property of the interna-
tional transmission mechanism. In the trade-linked SVAR system, the time-
varying nature of international links is directly captured by the time-varying
parameter structure. It reflects the changing cross-country linkages over time.
In Table 2.4, we present the accumulated impacts of one unit positive shock
in four primary engines of world growth on the world major economies, un-
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der two different international trade structures. For illustration, we select
the international trade structures in the period 1996 and 2013 to represent the
cross-border linkages among countries. The choice of international trade struc-
tures reflects our desire to identify the changing nature of international links,
as well as avoiding the major financial crisis. The financial crisis may create
the extraordinary multilateral relationships. Note that 1996 is just before the
Asian financial crisis and 2013 is after the recent global financial crisis.
Table 2.4 shows that the international transmission pattern shifts vastly
over this period. For example, the average accumulated impact of a shock in
the U.S. economy on the 61 economies is 1.30 in 1996, but declines to 0.73
in 2013. Similar patterns hold for the other two major industrial economies,
Japan and Germany. Now we focus on the impact on some representative
economies. In 1996, the development of the U.S. economy leads to the enor-
mous growth of small open economies like Singapore and Malaysia. One unit
increase of the U.S. economy has triggered 4.09 and 3.94 growth of these
economies. However, under the recent economic landscape, the degree of de-
pendence for these small open economies on the U.S. economy decreases sig-
nificantly. The impact of the U.S. economy on these economies have halved in
2013, compared to 1996.
Moving to the fast growing emerging market, there is an enhancement
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of the long-run global impact of China’s economy over time. The average
accumulated global impact of a shock in China’s economy is modest as 0.24
in 1996, but has doubled to 0.49 in the following twenty years. Comparing
across the countries, the emerging markets are more likely to be affected by
the growth of China. Looking at the time span, all the major economies have
experienced the rising impacts from the growth of China. In general, compared
with the international impacts of the U.S., we document moderate but growing
spillover effects of the China’s economy.
The empirical evidence above document substantial changes of the interna-
tional transmission patterns over time. It reflects the changing nature of the
cross-border trade and financial linkages. Our findings highlight the impor-
tance of accounting for these changing properties in modelling the worldwide
interdependency structure.
2.4 Conclusion
Globalization spurs rising production, trade and financial integration across
countries and generates common business cycles at global and country group
levels (Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2003; Kose, Otrok and Prasad, 2012).
This paper examines the international transmission mechanism of national
macroeconomic fluctuations, investigating the cross-country channels of the
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spillovers that trigger the common business cycles. We utilize a trade-linked
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model with a realistic identification
scheme to construct a worldwide dynamic interdependency system covering
60 major economies and the rest of the world. The empirical results indicate
that the SVAR system can largely recover the common dynamic properties of
the national business cycle fluctuations, providing a transmission foundation
to factor model based world business cycle framework.
Using the estimated SVAR model, we further locate the main channels of
interactions among the major economies and trace out the dynamic response
of one economy to another. We pay particular attentions to quantitatively
measuring the global impact of two recent events of interest: a recovery in
the U.S. economy and a slowdown in China’s economy. Our empirical findings
confirm the dominating status of the U.S. economy. Besides, we provide further
evidence of the existence of a regional effect (Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2003)
observed for the North American Region. Asian emerging markets constitute
the most vigorous economies in recent years. We show that the movements of
the U.S. economy in general profoundly affect the Asian emerging economies.
One exception is China. The shocks in the U.S. market only have a moderate
impact on the China’s economy.
Recently, the impact of the slowdown of China’s growth has been a primary
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concern of both academia and central governments. Our findings show that
the deceleration of China’s growth leads to a significant decline of growth
across the world, suggesting an important role China’s market is playing in
the current global economic landscape. In particular, the slump in China’s
demand triggers a severe crash in Asian emerging markets.
Why do the fluctuations of one influential economy, e.g. the U.S. or China,
would have such a profound impact on the world, affecting the economies even
with few direct trade and financial links with it? To answer this question, we
identify the direct bilateral effect and indirect multiplier effect from the impulse
response function. We show that the average total accumulated impact of one
unit shock in U.S. is 0.86 across the 60 economies and rest of world in our
country set, 18 percent of which comes from the direct effect and 82 percent
comes from the indirect effect. It indicates that the indirect multiplier effect
plays a vital role in the international transmission of national fluctuations, and
explains why a shock initiated in one country can trigger a substantial impact
all over the world.
The global economic landscape has shifted dramatically since the mid-
1980s. By examining the global impact of four growth engines in different
time periods, we document a vast change of the international transmission
patterns over time. More specifically, the traditional industrial economies have
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experienced a decline of external impact. In contrast, the rise of emerging mar-
kets make themselves more influential under the current economic landscape.
Our findings reflect the changing nature of the cross-border trade and finan-
cial linkages. They highlight the importance of accounting for these changing
properties in modelling the worldwide interdependency structure.
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Chapter 3
Revisiting the Impact of Oil




Investigating the relationship between oil price shocks and macroeconomic
performance has been a topic of interest at least since the first oil crisis in
1973. Recent dramatic fluctuations in oil price have rekindled the interest
in assessing the worldwide impact of oil price shocks. This is all the more
interesting because, unlike the ensuing recessions caused by oil price hikes in
the early 1970s, the impact of oil price fluctuations now appear to be subdued.
This demands investigating the global impact of oil price fluctuations at a
highly disaggregated level.
With a steady increase in trade and financial integration, we expect the
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movements of oil price to affect the global economy through two channels.
First, shocks in the crude oil market should have a direct impact on different
economies. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between net oil importers
and net oil exporters. For the net oil importers, the lower oil price directly
leads to a drop in oil cost and a rise in real income. At the firm level, the
lower oil price triggers a decline in production cost especially where oil or oil
products are a major input in their production process. This further translates
into lowering price of their goods and services. At the household level, the
lower oil price lowers the cost of living, leading to an increase in real income
and a higher level of spending, hence a higher growth for the economy. The
magnitude of this lower oil price impact depends on the industry structure
and the degree of oil dependence in each country. For the net oil exporting
countries, price falls in the crude oil market directly lead to a decline in their
oil revenue. It further drags the government spending and other economic
activities that rely highly on oil revenue. An exogenous oil price decline is
therefore redistributive in an international perspective. At the global level,
the windfall gains of oil importers are the losses of oil exporters. Overall, the
oil price has different dynamic effects on different types of countries and hence
has a complex total impact on the global economy.
Second, the above direct channel is not the end of story. Oil price fluctua-
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tions also have an impact on the global economy through an indirect multiplier
channel. Over the past thirty years, globalization and trade and financial inte-
gration across countries has led to the emergence of a common business cycle
at the global and country group levels (e.g., Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2003,
2008; Kose, Otrok and Prasad, 2012; Stock and Watson, 2005b). Therefore,
the redistributive global impact of oil shocks transmit across countries through
these cross-country linkages. For example, a lower oil price boosts the growth
of the U.S., which in turn, triggers an expansion of the demand for exports
from Mexico, which is a net oil exporter. The indirect multiplier channel,
along with the direct channel, provide a comprehensive pattern of the impact
of oil price shocks at a global level. There is, however, not much research done
along this line.
In this paper, we introduce a large-scale open-economy structural VAR
model, linking all the major economies in the world, including the primary oil
producers and oil importers. Uncovering the dynamics of direct and indirect
oil price impact by constructing a worldwide dynamic system is important for
this study. First, since the world economies are highly integrated nowadays,
including only a small number of countries is too narrow to capture the whole
picture of international spillover, which distorts the indirect multiplier effect
and leads to the omitted variable problem. Second, given the rising prominence
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of emerging and developing markets, a narrow focus on some country groups
is no longer tenable. Third, in a small scale model, impulse responses can only
be observed for the small group of included countries. This does not meet the
increasing demand for information especially on indirect effects by the policy
makers over the world and international regulatory institutions.
We first examine the dynamic profiles of direct and indirect impact of crude
oil price fluctuations on growth performance of different types of economies.
The results show that both the direct effect and indirect multiplier effect play
important roles in explaining the impact of oil price swings on growth of
the economies. Therefore, the overall effect of oil price movements on each
economy depends not only on the country type, net oil exporter or importer,
but also on the underlying external international interdependency structure
of them. Our results show that, through the cross-country indirect multiplier
effect, the negative effects of an increase in oil price on a net oil importer are
likely to be offset by the increasing external demand of oil producers. Although
the higher oil price may benefit oil producers in the short run, they may also
lose in the long run.
As the literature demonstrates, it is also important to account for the en-
dogeneity of oil prices changes and differentiate between the effects of demand
and supply shocks in energy markets when one attempts to assess the macroe-
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conomic impact of oil price shocks. Oil price fluctuations driven by demand
and supply shocks are also expected to have distinct effects through the direct
and indirect multiplier channels, which are covered in the second part of the
study. We adapt the methodology introduced in Kilian (2009) and decompose
the movements of oil price into three structural shocks: (1) crude oil supply
shocks (oil supply shocks), (2) shocks to the demand for all industrial com-
modities in the global market (aggregate demand shocks), and (3) demand
shocks that are specific to the global crude oil markets (oil-specific demand
shocks). Our findings show substantial distinct macroeconomic impact of oil
price shocks corresponding to different sources, confirming the importance of
understanding the roots of oil price shifts. Notably, the negative impact of oil
price increase elicited by aggregate demand shocks on major industrial coun-
tries can be largely canceled out by the booming global economy captured by
the indirect multiplier channel. Oil-specific demand shocks may give a boost
to the major oil exporters at the beginning, but oil importers may suffer. In
the long run, most of the countries, even the oil exporters, cannot escape from
the negative oil impact operating through the indirect multiplier channel.
The findings of this study have clear implications for policy. Overall, we
highlight that the total effect of oil price movements on each economy depends
not only on the country type, net oil exporter or importer, but also on the
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underlying external international interdependency structure of them. For ex-
ample, for a small open economy and net oil exporter, Malaysia, an increase
in oil price is not necessarily beneficial in the long run. The higher oil revenue
is likely to be canceled out through the channel of weak demand of its trad-
ing partners. Furthermore, not all oil price shocks are alike. The underlying
source of oil price movement plays a crucial role in determining the direct and
indirect impact of oil shocks. This further cautions the policy makers on the
importance of understanding the roots of the shift in the oil price.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the exist-
ing literature and discusses how this paper complements the current research.
Section 3.3 introduces trade-linked SVAR model, which helps us to disentangle
the direct and indirect effect of oil price movements. In this section, we also
brief the data set and estimation strategy. Section 3.4 presents the empirical
results based on the international transmission mechanism we trace out in this
paper. Section 3.5 further decomposes the oil price and investigates the direct
and indirect macroeconomic impact under different underlying sources of the
oil price shift. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper mainly relates to two strands of studies. The first strand is con-
cerned with macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks. The seminal
work of Hamilton (1983) concludes that almost all recessions in the U.S. have
been preceded by a spike up in oil prices, implying an essential role for oil price
increases as one of the major causes of recessions. Blanchard and Gali (2007)
use a structural VAR model to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks
and shows that the effect of oil price shocks on output and inflation is more
muted after 1984 than it was in the post-war period. For now, it is widely
accepted that oil demand shocks are not the same as oil supply shocks. As a
result, in recent years, plentiful studies have been done to explicitly identify oil
supply and demand shocks, examining their underlying distinct effects on the
real price of oil and the macroeconomic performance. For instance, Hamilton
(2003) develops a quantitative dummy measure of exogenous oil supply shocks
and investigate its predictive power for changes in the price of oil and the U.S.
real GDP. Kilian (2008a,b) proposes an alternative measure of exogenous oil
supply shocks obtained by constructing explicit counterfactuals for all major
oil producers, and compare the responses of inflation and real output across
major industrial economies to this measure of oil supply shocks. Besides, Kil-
ian (2009) introduces another approach which relies on exclusion restrictions
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in structural VAR models of the global oil market to disentangle oil supply and
demand shocks. Peersman and Van Robays (2012) adopt a similar framework
to compare the macroeconomic consequences of several types of oil shocks
across a set of industrialized countries. Baumeister and Peersman (2013) use
a time-varying Bayesian VAR model to examine the changing impact of oil
supply shocks on the U.S. economy. One common feature of this literature is
that they focus on one particular country or utilize a country-by-country anal-
ysis to investigate the oil impact on some country groups, and do not account
for the interplay across the economies.
The second strand of research investigate the international transmission
mechanism and the world business cycle. Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003)
employ a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model to study the common dynamic
properties of business-cycle fluctuations in a 60-country sample, providing ev-
idence of a world business cycle. Stock and Watson (2005b) use a structural
factor VAR to identify common international shocks. Kose, Otrok and White-
man (2008) and Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2012) further evaluate the evolution
of the world business cycle as well as macroeconomic comovements within
different regions or country groups. Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005) focus on
the Asian financial crisis, studying the transmission mechanism through trade
links. Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega (2007) study the dynamics and cross-
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country interdependencies in G-7 countries. Dees et al. (2007) use a global
VAR model to investigate the impact of external shocks on the euro area
economy. Mumtaz and Surico (2009) examine the dynamic effects on the U.K.
economy given an unanticipated shock in the rest of the world, by extend-
ing a Factor-Augmented VAR approach to the open economy. This literature
stresses that globalization spurs rising trade and financial integration across
countries and generates a common business cycle at global and country group
levels. Therefore, understanding the international transmission of national
structural shocks is crucial for academic discussion as well as for designing
best policy responses to international developments.
This paper connects these two strands of literature and complements the
existing research by investigating the oil price impact on different types of
countries in an open economy context. As stated earlier, it is of particular
interest to us to disentangle the direct impact of oil shocks on the major
economies, as well as the indirect multiplier impact of oil shocks transmitted
through international linkages. A search of the literature shows that only
two published papers have investigated the topic in similar lines. Abeysinghe
(2001a) provides a leading work with a focus on the oil exporters in ASEAN
and Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) pay particular attention to Russia. Our
study advances these two papers as expounded in the previous section.
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3.3 Decomposition of the Global Oil Price Im-
pacts
3.3.1 An Open Economy Structural VAR
To identify both the direct and indirect impact of oil price movements, we need
to link all the major economies and construct a worldwide dynamic interde-
pendency system. Therefore, in this section, we first introduce a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR) model with a realistic identification scheme to
trace out the international transmission mechanism of national macroeconomic
movements across the world. The large-scale SVAR method adopted in this
paper is built on the work of Abeysinghe (1999, 2001b), Abeysinghe and Forbes
(2005) and Abeysinghe and Yifan (2015). More specifically, this method si-
multaneously equates output supply and demand across trading partners that
leads to the model:
(B0 ∙Wt)yt = λ + (B1 ∙Wt−1)yt−1 + ... + (Bp ∙Wt−p)yt−p + εt, (3.1)
where yt is an (n×1) vector of GDP growth series, B’s sare unknown (n×n)
parameter matrices, and εt is an (n×1) vector of structural shocks. Wt is a
known matrix of weights made up of bilateral export shares. The notation
of ‘∙’ indicates the Hadamard product giving the element-wise product of two
matrices. The diagonal terms of B ∙W measure persistence of domestic growth
shocks, and the off-diagonal terms measure the degree of sensitivity to external
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growth shocks for each country. We denote the bilateral export share from
country i to country j as wijt at time t.
1 For n = 3 and p = 1, the parameter
matrices take the form:
B0 =
 1 −β01 −β01−β02 1 −β02
−β03 −β03 1
 , B1 =
φ11 β11 β11β12 φ22 β12
β13 β13 φ33
 ,Wt =
 1 w12t w13tw21t 1 w23t
w31t w32t 1
 .
Note that one important feature of this model is that the effective param-
eter matrices Bi ∙ Wt−i change over time, which is essential to capture the
time-varying nature of cross-country linkages and the vast movement of the
economic landscape.2
The system in (3.1) can be easily extended to a structural VARX model to
account for the impact of exogenous variables. With oil price or its extracted
shock components, the structural VARX model can be written as:
(B0 ∙Wt)yt = λ+(B1 ∙Wt−1)yt−1 + ...+(Bp ∙Wt−p)yt−p +Γ0Xt + ...+ΓqXt−q +ξt,
(3.2)
where Xt is an (n× 1) vector of oil price series or oil price shocks, q is the lag
order and Γ’s are diagonal matrices, measuring the sensitivity of the macroe-
conomic aggregates to oil price movements, and ξt is the structural shock.
1 Bilateral export shares add up to unity such that
∑n
j=1 wijt = 1, i 6= j.
2 Abeysinghe and Yifan (2015) show that this method can largely recover the dynamic
properties of the world business cycle (Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2003; Kose, Otrok and
Prasad, 2012) and capture the transmission mechanism across countries.
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After estimating the structural VARX model, we can derive the impulse
responses of output growth with respect to changes in Xt from
yt = λ
∗ + R(L)Xt + ut, (3.3)
where R(L) = Bw(L)−1Γ(L), Bw(L) = (B0 ∙ Wt)−(B1 ∙Wt)L−...−(Bp ∙Wt)Lp,
and Γ(L) = Γ0 + Γ1L + ... + ΓqL
q. For country i, the iith diagonal element
of R(L) provides the direct impact of oil prices on growth and the ij (j =
1, 2, ..., n− 1; i 6= j) off-diagonal terms provide the indirect oil impact through
the (n− 1) trading partners.
The method we adopt has three appealing features: First, it can handle
a large scale VAR model without running into the curse of dimensionality.
Second, it utilizes economic theory to develop a realistic identification scheme,
without having to adopt purely statistical methods such as recursive identifi-
cation schemes as is frequently done in the VARX literature. Third, it allows
cross-country relationships to evolve over time and renders a changing param-
eter structure to the model. This is particularly important in assessing the
impact before and after a crisis that usually requires a split-sample analysis
which is often not possible due to reduced sample sizes.
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3.3.2 Data
Although the structural model (3.2) requires only three sets of variables, GDP
growth for each country (yi), export shares linking each pair of counties (W )
and a measure of oil price (o), it is not trivial to compile consistent time series
for the sample we consider. This section summarizes the key characteristics of
this data set, and the Appendix describes the compilation process in detail.
The data set includes 60 economies with quarterly data for the period run-
ning from 1985.1 to 2013.4. The choice of the starting date reflects our desire
to maximize the sample length while considering as a large number of countries
as possible.3 The country set contains not only most of the industrial countries
and emerging market economies, but also the major developing countries since
they are also highly involved in the globalization process. Table 3.1 reports
the country set. In total, they account for 89 percent of world GDP in 2013.
The GDP growth is computed as yit = Δ ln(Yit), where Yit is the seasonally
adjusted real GDP of country i, at time t. For export shares we use the bilateral
flows of merchandise exports between the countries. We calculate the export-
share matrix (Wt) as a 12-quarter moving average of export shares to allow
3 In addition, this is also the period when the remarkable globalization takes place (Kose,
Otrok and Prasad, 2012). Also, several research (e.g. Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Mork, 1989)
report a structural break of oil price impact on macroeconomic performance around the mid
1980s. This is often attributed to the collapse of the OPEC cartel, decrease of real wage
rigidities, decline of oil dependence and the start of the Great Moderation.
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Table 3.1: Country List
Industrial Emerging Other Developing Countries
Australia Argentina Bangladesh
Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Cameroon
Canada Brazil Congo, Republic of
Denmark Chile Cote d’Ivoire
Finland China, P.R.: Hong Kong Cyprus
France China, P.R.: Mainland Ghana
Germany Colombia Guyana
Greece Egypt Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iceland India Kenya
Ireland Indonesia Malta
Italy Korea, Republic of Mozambique
Japan Malaysia Nigeria
Netherlands Mexico Pakistan
New Zealand Morocco Saudi Arabia
Norway Peru Senegal






Notes : Country classification is based on the IMF’s definition.
for the export-share matrix to vary smoothly over time. Although a constant
W matrix would simplify the data requirement and model estimation, this is
not realistic since trade patterns change significantly over the long time period
under consideration.
For the oil price series, we use the U.S. dollar spot price of Brent crude
oil, which is denoted by Ot. For the analysis in Section 3.4, we convert the
original monthly data to the quarterly frequency by taking the averaging. 4 The
oil price series is expressed in terms of oil price inflation as Xt = Δ ln(Ot). We
also experiment a number of alternative measures of oil price. For example
4Decomposition of oil price into demand-supply shocks is discussed in Section 3.5.
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xit = Δ ln(Ot ∙Eit) and xit = Δ ln(Ot ∙Eit/Pit), where Eit is the exchange rate
of country i against the U.S. dollar and Pit is the CPI of country i, at time t.
Since the changes in oil price is so dominant that the above conversions do not
have much effect on the variation in oil prices. Preliminary estimates based on
these measures show similar results.5 To save space, we report the empirical
results with the first measure.
3.4 Response Estimates in the Baseline Model
As a baseline case, in this section, we investigate the direct and indirect multi-
plier impacts of an oil price shock and in Section 3.5 we will consider demand
and supply shocks separately. It is useful have such a baseline scenario for a
comparison because the separation of oil price shocks into demand and supply
components depends on the efficacy of the method used. After a preliminary
analysis of residual autocorrelations, we set lag order p = q = 4 to govern the
dynamics of the model in (3.2).6 We tried both ordinary least squares (OLS)
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the model and found similar
results under each estimation procedure. To conserve space, we concentrate
on the results from OLS estimates.
5The stylized facts discussed in the following section are also robust if one uses alternative
oil price measures, such as the PPI index for crude oil (used for example by Hamilton (1983))
or the price of imported crude oil (e.g. Kilian (2009)).
6Empirical results are robust to reasonable changes of lag orders.
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Figure 3.1: Total Impact of One-standard-deviation (15.5%) Increase in Oil
Price on the G7 Countries and China
Notes:The plots show the cumulated total impact of one-standard-deviation  (15.5%) increase in oil price on GDP growth for the G7 countries and China, together with 68%

























































Note that the direct and indirect multiplier impact is subject to the time-
varying trade share matrix Wt, which reflects the changing properties of the
global economic landscape.7 Since our focus is more on recent events we gen-
erate impulse responses based on the W matrix from 2013Q2. Although we
cover 60 countries in the model, for the sake of brevity and to highlight the key
results we present the results only for G-7, China and the major oil exporters.
3.4.1 The G-7 Countries and China
7For example, the world economy today is more likely to be affected by the fluctuations
of China’s economy compared to thirty years ago.
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Figure 3.2: Direct and Indirect Impact of One-standard-deviation (15.5%)
Increase in Oil Price on the G7 Countries and China
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation (15.5%) increase in oil price on GDP growth for the G7 countries and China.

























































Figure 3.1 summarizes the total impact of one-standard-deviation (15.5%) in-
crease oil price on the growth of the G-7 countries and China, together with
68% and 95% confidence intervals.8 Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 further decom-
pose this total oil price impact into direct and indirect effects. The numbers
reported are the cumulative effects. The short-run effect is represented by the
sum of four quarters and the long-run effect by the sum of 20 quarters. After
20 quarters the impulse responses turn virtually negligible. Figure 3.2 shows
the total effect by the red solid line, the direct effect by the yellow dotted
8The confidence intervals are constructed by the standard residual-based recursive-design
bootstrap with 1000 replications.
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Table 3.2: Impact of One-standard deviation (15.5%) Increase in Oil Price on
the G7 Countries and China
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler
Impact
Total Impact
Canada Short Run 0.12 0.10 0.22
Long Run -0.04 -0.59 -0.62
China Short Run -0.05 0.05 0.00
Long Run -0.22 -0.08 -0.30
France Short Run -0.45 0.31 -0.14
Long Run -1.58 0.07 -1.51
Germany Short Run -0.22 0.46 0.24
Long Run -0.52 -0.36 -0.88
Italy Short Run -0.15 0.32 0.17
Long Run -0.36 -0.57 -0.94
Japan Short Run 0.19 0.35 0.54
Long Run 0.16 -0.23 -0.07
United Kingdom Short Run -0.28 0.24 -0.05
Long Run -0.70 -0.27 -0.97
United States Short Run -0.46 0.43 -0.03
Long Run -1.07 0.24 -0.83
Table 2. Impact of One-standard deviation (15.5%) Increase in Oil Price on the G7 Countries and China
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20 quarters.  Results
are reported in percentage points.
line and the indirect effect by the purple dotted line. We do not report the
confidence intervals in Figure 3.2 to avoid the clutter. The following major
observations emerge from these figures:
1. As expected, the total oil price effect is in general negative in the
long run. For example, in the long run, a one-standard-deviation increase in
oil price is likely to produce 0.41 percentage point decline in the U.S. GDP
growth. China is the second largest crude oil importer in the world today.
As expected, the total impact of oil price increase on China’s growth is also
negative. In the long run, the magnitude of this decline is 0.38 percentage
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points.
2. The direct effect contributes to a large fraction of the total negative oil
price impact. With the exception of Germany and Japan, the net oil importers
face a negative direct impact from the oil price increase. Compared to the total
effect, the negative impact of oil shocks operating through the direct channel is
even more severe for the two largest economies, China and the US. This direct
effect is stronger in the long run. Canada is a net oil exporter in the G-7 group.
Our empirical findings show that, in the short run, the upward movement of
oil price does boost Canada’s economy. In the long run, this direct impact is
negative but negligible. In general, it stays in line with the status of net oil
exporter of Canada. Despite being a net exporter of crude oil, the U.K. is a
net importer of non-oil energy. This results in the totally negative impact of
oil shock for the U.K.9 The direct positive effect on Germany and Japan is
puzzling. Nevertheless, this empirical regularity has been well acknowledged
by others in the literature (e.g., Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Peersman and Van
Robays, 2012). One argument in the literature to explain this positive direct
effect is the energy efficiency.10
3. The mixed pattern of indirect effects highlights the strength of trade
9More details about this argument, see Peersman and Van Robays (2012).
10The energy efficiency may help to understand the limited positive oil impact on Japan’s
economy, but it is still inadequate for Germany. Some other factors we are not able to
account for in the model may govern this positive abnormal pattern.
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linkages of these economies with each other and also with the net oil exporters
outside the group. For most of oil importers, because of the international
transmission mechanism, the critical negative direct impact of oil price increase
can be offset to some extent by the indirect multiplier impact. For example,
in the short run, the increase in external demand primarily coming from net
oil exporters may provide a 0.25 percentage point growth impact on the U.S.
economy. In the long run, this indirect impact reduces to 0.11 because of the
global impact on the net oil importers. This is evident in the case of Canada
that suffers a -0.30 indirect impact. This large indirect impact is not hard to
understand. For example, the U.S. is the primary trading partner of Canada.
The higher oil price first drags the U.S. growth and subsequently the Canadian
economy as well. Similar to Canada, we document -0.67 and -0.25 percentage
point indirect long-run impact for Germany and Japan. This suggests that
these two countries are sensitive to the world business cycle, and a rise in
oil price can largely drag their economies through their external linkages. In
short, it is evident that the indirect multiplier impact plays a critical role in
generating the global impact of oil price shift.
3.4.2 Oil Exporters
Figure 3.3 reports the total impact of one-standard-deviation increase of oil
price on the major oil exporters in our sample. Figure 3.4 and Table 3.3 present
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Figure 3.3: Total Impact of One-standard-deviation (15.5%) Increase in Oil
Price on Major Oil Exporting Countries
Notes:The plots show the cumulated total impact of one-standard-deviation (15.5%) increase in oil price on GDP growth for major oil exporting countries, together with 68%


















































corresponding direct and indirect impacts. The prominent observations can
be summarized as follows.
1. In general, a rise in oil price does benefit the oil exporters. In this re-
gard we can group these oil exporters into three types. The first type includes
countries like Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. The total impact of higher oil
price is huge for these countries. It reflects the fact that the growth of these
countries significantly depends on oil revenues. The second type includes coun-
tries like Indonesia, Mexico, and Malaysia. The empirical results show that
the total oil impacts on these countries are also positive, but the magnitude
122
Figure 3.4: Direct and Indirect Impact of One-standard-deviation (15.5%)
Increase in Oil Price on Major Oil Exporting Countries
Notes : The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation (15.5%) increase in oil price on GDP growth for major oil exporters. Results














































is muted compared to the first group. These countries share the features of
small open economies, and their exports are more diversified compared to the
countries in the first group. The third type includes Norway. The impulse re-
sponse pattern of Norway is slightly different from the oil exporters analyzed
above, but is very similar to Canada, another industrial country and a net oil
exporter.
2. The total positive effect mainly comes from the direct channel. Except
for Norway, we document positive direct impacts on the oil exporters. Besides,
even for Norway, we show a positive direct impact in the short run. In the long
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Table 3.3: Impact of One-standard-deviation (15.5%) Increase in Oil Price on
Major Oil Exporting Countries
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler
Impact
Total Impact
Indonisia Short Run 1.26 -0.01 1.26
Long Run 1.87 0.14 2.01
Iran Short Run 0.61 0.06 0.67
Long Run 1.01 0.00 1.01
Malaysia Short Run 1.06 0.12 1.18
Long Run 1.07 -0.12 0.95
Mexico Short Run 0.41 0.07 0.48
Long Run 0.45 -0.64 -0.18
Nigeria Short Run 0.43 0.11 0.54
Long Run 1.93 0.09 2.02
Norway Short Run -0.28 0.20 -0.08
Long Run -0.20 -0.42 -0.61
Russia Short Run 1.15 0.26 1.41
Long Run 1.19 -0.54 0.66
Saudi Arabia Short Run 1.81 -0.33 1.49
Long Run 1.73 0.06 1.79
Table 3. Impact of One-standard-deviation (15.5%) Increase in Oil Price on Major Oil Exporting Countries
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20 quarters.  Results
are reported in percentage points.
run, this direct impact is negative, but negligible. Compared to the impulse
responses for the G-7 countries and China, the direct impacts for oil importers
are in general stronger and the responses happen much faster.
3. Operating through the indirect multiplier channel, most of these coun-
tries experience an opposite oil impact in the short run, and half of these
countries, like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Norway, even suffer from this
negative oil price impact in the long run. This provides an interesting obser-
vation that higher oil prices can hurt the oil exporters as well. Combined with
the empirical evidence in the pervious section, we show that the overall effect
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of oil price movement on each economy depends not only on the country type,
net oil exporter or importer, but also on the underlying external international
interdependency structure of them.
4. These findings also offer a new perspective to understanding the re-
source curse (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006). If
natural resources (in our case, oil) do contribute to the growth, why don’t we
see a positive correlation today between natural wealth and other kinds of eco-
nomic wealth? There is no universally accepted theory of the curse of natural
resources. However, we attempt to answer this question in an international
perspective, showing that the international transmission mechanism may be
a channel to explain this phenomenon. If oil abundance elicits the export-led
growth, it must be related to and affected by the external condition of the
world economy. We document negative indirect oil price effects for some oil
exporters, showing that the benefit of the resource abundance may not be as
large as we thought it to be.11
11We will further discuss this point of view in the later sections, after decomposing the oil
price. We show that negative indirect impacts can be more severe if oil price fluctuations
are driven by the precautionary demand shocks, which is the major source of the oil price
movements.
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3.5 The Differential Impact of Demand and
Supply Shocks in the Global Oil Market
As the literature illustrates, it is also important to account for the endogeneity
of oil prices and to differentiate between the effects of demand and supply
shocks. For this, we follow the Structural VAR method introduced in Kilian
(2009) to quantify the impact of demand and supply shocks in the global
crude oil market. In this section, we modify the pervious research and assess
the direct and indirect impact of these shocks on growth on the same set of
countries examined in the previous section. This helps us in a comparison of
the results.
3.5.1 Decomposing Oil Price into Demand and Supply
Shocks
Following Kilian (2009), the structural VAR model for decomposing the oil
price includes monthly data for zt = (Δprodt, reat, pot)
′, where Δprodt is the
percent change in global crude oil production, reat denotes an index of real
economic activity constructed as in Kilian (2009), and pot is the U.S. dollar
spot price of Brent crude oil. The reat and pot series are expressed in logs.
The sample period is 1980:1-2013:12. The structural VAR representation is
A0zt = α +
24∑
i=1
Aizt−i + εt, (3.4)
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where εt denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural
innovations. In this framework, it is postulated that the movements of the oil
price are driven by three structural shocks: (1) crude oil supply shocks (oil
supply shocks), (2) shocks to the demand for all industrial commodities in the
global market (aggregate demand shocks), (3) demand shocks that are specific
to the global crude oil market (oil-specific demand shocks).12
Following Kilian (2009), we assume that A−10 has a recursive structure such








a11 0 0a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33
 εoil supply shocktεaggregate demand shockt
εoil−specific demand shockt
 .
The reduced-form VAR model is consistently estimated by the least-squares
method. The resulting estimates are used to construct the structural VAR
representation of the model.
Figure 3.5 reports the historical decomposition of oil price based on the





12The aggregate demand shock is designed to capture shifts in the demand for inter-
national commodities (including crude oil) driven by the world business cycle and global
developments. The oil-specific demand shock is designed to capture oil price change driven
by higher precautionary demand, which is related to the concerns about future shortage of
oil supply. For more details, see Kilian (2009).
13Kilian (2009) discusses the validity of this identification scheme.
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Figure 3.5: Historical Decomposition of Oil Price, 1983:1-2013:12
Figure 5. Historical Decomposition of Oil Price, 1983:1-2013:12 
        Notes: Estimates are derived from the Kilian's model (2009).
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100 Cumulative Effect of Aggregate Demand Shock on Price of Crude Oil





100 Cumulative Effect of Oil-specific Demand Shock on Price of Crude Oil
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where θji is the parameter governing the impulse response process estimated in
the VAR model, and j refers to the three types of structural shocks.14 Figure
3.5 allows us to assess the determinants of oil price movements in the time line,
and reveals some interesting stylized facts. For example, it indicates that oil
supply shocks contribute a little fraction to the historical variation of oil price
over the sample period since 1980. The volatility of oil price mainly comes
from the two demand shocks. More specifically, the oil-specific demand shocks
relate to sharp swings of the oil price series. It reflects the nature that oil-
specific demand shocks are associated with people’s expectation in the future
oil market, which can rapidly change in response to market-related information
such as exogenous political events.
3.5.2 Global Impact of Different Types of Oil Price Shocks
A question of considerable interest is how the oil price movements triggered by
different structural shocks contribute to direct and indirect multiplier effects,
therefore, constitute the total oil impact. To answer this question, we extract
the quarterly series from the monthly decomposed series estimated in Equation
(3.5). Quarterly values are the end period values of the monthly series. We
take the first difference for the oil price movements driven by aggregate demand
14The spot oil price in each period is simply the sum of three decomposed oil price series
constructed in this study.
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shocks and oil-specific demand shocks to induce stationarity. As before, we
use the trade share matrix from the second quarter of 2013 to focus on more
recent outcomes.
Note that this paper differs from Kilian (2009) in the way of choosing the
decomposed oil series for the analysis. To assess the effects of oil price distur-
bances on the U.S. economy, Kilian directly relates the structural innovations
εt in model (3.4) to the U.S. macroeconomic aggregates. For example, the
impact on GDP is assessed by estimating:













is the constructed quarterly shocks by averaging the monthly structural inno-
vations, j refers to three types of shocks. Although these structural innovations
indeed govern the oil price fluctuations, straightly linking them to the macroe-
conomic aggregates render some difficulty of interpretation. For example, if
we replace the oil price Xt with aggregate demand shocks in the structural
VARX system (3.2), we are actually measuring the impact of a global boom,
not truly the demand component of oil price. Comparison to Equation (3.5)
clearly shows that the simple structural innovation measure fails to capture the
dynamics delivered by the impulse response functions, θij . Therefore, in our
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Figure 3.6: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shocks on the G7 Coun-
tries and China, Aggregate Demand Shocks
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation increase in the aggregate demand component of oil price on GDP growth for


























































paper, we directly utilize the decomposed oil price series as in (3.5), instead
of the structural innovations. It is more consistent with the research topic
of investigating distinct macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks originated
from different sources. In the following discussions we present only the graphs
of cumulative impulse responses and tables are provided in the Appendix.
Global Impact of Oil Price Fluctuations Driven by Aggregate De-
mand Shocks
As in the baseline case, Figure 3.6 presents the results for the G-7 countries
and China and Figure 3.7 for the major oil exporters. The following observa-
tions emerge from these results. First, a higher oil price driven by aggregate
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demand shocks is not necessary to trigger a recession in the oil importing
economies. Oil price movements driven by aggregate demand shocks are asso-
ciated with a booming world economy. Under this circumstance, the negative
direct impact of higher oil price is likely to be cancelled out by the indirect
channel. Compared to the baseline model, we notice a substantial upward
shift of the indirect impact curve. For the oil importers, they experience a
positive indirect impact in the short run. This positive impact is declining but
remains positive for most of countries. Through the international transmission
mechanism, this development can, in turn, benefit the oil importers. Moving
to the direct oil impact, it is also muted compared to the baseline model.
Second, the changing pattern of indirect multiplier impact is also the case
for the oil exporters. We notice short-run positive indirect impact for all the
countries in the figure. For Indonesia and Malaysia, these positive impacts
even persist in the long run. For the rest of the countries, the indirect impacts
tend to be neutral in the long run. These empirical results are more inter-
esting if we compare them with the baseline model. In the baseline model,
we show that the indirect impact may significantly lower the growth of more
open oil exporting economies like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico. However,
given the price change driven by the demand shocks, these negative indirect
impacts disappear. Considering the direct impact, most of these oil exporters
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Figure 3.7: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shock on Major Oil
Exporting Countries, Aggregate Demand Shocks
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation increase in the aggregate demand component of oil price on GDP growth for



















































experience a boom from an aggregate demand shock. The only exception is
Mexico. However, compared to the magnitude of the oil impact on other oil
exporters, this negative impact is negligibly small.
Global Impact of Oil Price Fluctuations Driven by Precautionary
Demand Shocks
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 present the global impact of oil price fluctuations
driven by precautionary demand shocks. We can note the following key obser-
vations from these figures. First, unlike the aggregate demand shocks, we see
that the oil price movement driven by the precautionary demand shocks is as-
sociated with a severe contraction of the economies of the major oil importers.
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Figure 3.8: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shocks on the G7 Coun-
tries and China, Precautionary Demand Shocks
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation increase in the precautionary demand component of oil price on GDP growth

























































Compared to the baseline model, we can document a substantial downward
shift of the indirect impact curve. In this case, these negative indirect effects
may reinforce the negative direct impact, instead of offsetting it. The only two
exceptions are China and the U.S. However, compared to the baseline model,
the positive indirect effects for these two countries are both 0.04 percentage
points, which are also of smaller magnitude. Altogether, we document that
the higher oil price driven by precautionary demand shocks triggers a severe
contraction in oil importing economies.
Second, for all the major oil exporters, we document that higher oil price
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Figure 3.9: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shock on Major Oil
Exporting Countries, Precautionary Demand Shocks
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation increase in the precautionary demand component of oil price on GDP growth













































driven by precautionary demand can hurt them substantially. Although the
higher oil price driven by precautionary demand shocks still boost the economies
of net oil exporters, we document that all these major oil exporter also suffer
from the indirect channel in the long run. For the largest oil exporter, Saudi
Arabia, the direct impact boosts growth by 0.88 percentage points and indi-
rect impact accounts for a 0.43 percentage point decline. For the small open
economies of Indonesia and Malaysia, the direct impact accounts for 0.82 and
0.83 percentage point growth respectively, and the indirect effect generates
0.23 and 0.53 percentage point slump respectively. This provides an interest-
ing fact that the higher oil price is not always a good news for the oil exporters.
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Figure 3.10: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shocks on the G7
countries and China, Supply ShocksFigure 10. Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shocks on the G7 countries and China, Supply Shocks
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation increase in the supply component of oil price on GDP growth for the G7

























































Besides, since the precautionary demand shock is one of the two major trig-
gers of oil price movements, we note that windfall gains from oil abundance
can be largely mitigated by the international transmission channel. This is
more so apparent in the small open oil exporters. Our findings provide a new
perspective to explaining the resource curse.
Global Impact of Oil Price Fluctuations Driven by Supply Shocks
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 display the global impact of oil price fluctuations
driven by supply shocks. We can note the following observations from these
figures. First, the indirect impact is more diversified compared to the previous
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Figure 3.11: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shock on Major Oil
Exporting Countries, Supply Shocks
Figure 11.  Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Market Shock on Major Oil Exporting Countries, Supply Shocks
Notes:The plots show the cumulated direct, indirect and total impact of one-standard-deviation increase in the supply component of oil price on GDP growth for major oil



















































two shocks.15 For example, in the long run, the indirect impact for Japan is
positive with 0.33 percentage point increase in growth. In contrast, for France,
the indirect impact contributes to 0.18 percentage point contraction. But the
indirect impact for the U.S. tends to be neutral. The indirect impact is positive
for Saudi Arabia in the long run, but negative for Nigeria.
Second, oil supply shocks also constitute diverging direct response patterns
for the oil exporters. Supply shocks are normally associated with a turmoil in
oil producing countries. As a result, the supply shocks should have complex
impacts on these oil producers. On the one hand, the higher oil price boosts
the oil revenue for the oil exporters which are not involved in the oil production
disruption. On the other hand, oil supply shock can also be regarded as an
indicator of economic or political turmoils in certain countries. This complex
nature is reflected by the direct impact of oil supply shocks for different oil
exporters in Figure 3.11. For the oil exporters in the Middle East, a rise in
oil price driven by the oil supply shocks still boost their economies in the long
run, but the magnitude is much lower. For Mexico, its oil production increases
slowly from 1985 and starts to decline from 2004. This fact is reflected by the
negative direct impact of oil supply shocks on Mexico. Moving to countries
15In previous sections, we document a consistent upward shift of the indirect impact curve
given the aggregate demand shocks and downward shift given the precautionary demand
shocks.
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which are more likely to be immune to oil production disruption, like Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Norway, oil supply shocks contribute to an even higher growth
for these countries, compared to the baseline model.
Third, turning to oil importers, oil price movements driven by supply
shocks are in general associated with a negative direct effect. The only ex-
ception is China that records a the positive direct impact with the oil supply
shocks. However, provided China’s heavy dependence on coal, as opposed to
oil, this result actually fits our expectation. Moreover, oil supply disruptions
lead to a higher international price of coal, which may also benefit China’s
economy directly.
3.6 Conclusion
The fluctuations of oil price may affect each country mainly through two chan-
nels: the direct channel and indirect multiplier channel. The indirect channel
becomes more and more important as the global economy integrates more and
more. In this paper, we disentangle these direct and indirect oil price im-
pacts based on a large scale structural VAR model by linking all the major
economies through a time-varying trade matrix. The paper provides the esti-
mates of dynamic impact of oil price fluctuations on growth, on different types
of economies during the 1985-2013 period.
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The empirical evidence show that the indirect multiplier channel plays a
crucial role in explaining global impact of oil price movement. On the one
hand, the negative effects of rising oil price on net oil importers are likely to
be offset by the increasing external demand of oil producers. On the other
hand, the higher oil price may immediately benefit the oil producers but in
long run it may harm their economies. In an era of increasing international
linkages, our empirical results highlight the importance of identifying both the
direct and indirect multiplier effects in the investigation of macroeconomic im-
plications of oil price shocks. This study further cautions on potential pitfalls
of country by country analysis and even small scale VAR models in accessing
the macroeconomic impact of international commodities, like oil.
As the literature demonstrates, it is also important to account for the endo-
geneity of energy prices and to differentiate between the effects of demand and
supply shocks in energy markets when one attempts to assess to the macroeco-
nomic impact of oil shocks. The oil price fluctuation driven by supply shocks
and demand shocks are expected to have distinct impacts through the direct
and indirect multiplier channels, which are of particular interest in this study.
Therefore, we adopt the methodology introduced in Kilian (2009) and further
decompose the movements of oil price into three structural shocks: (1) crude
oil supply shocks (oil supply shocks), (2) shocks to the demand for all indus-
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trial commodities in global markets (aggregate demand shocks), (3) demand
shocks that are specific to the global crude oil markets (oil-specific demand
shocks). Our findings document substantial distinct macroeconomic impacts
of oil shocks emanating from different sources, confirming the importance of
understanding the roots of oil price shift. Particularly, the negative impact
of oil price increase elicited by the aggregate demand shocks on major indus-
trial countries can be largely compensated by the booming global economy
captured by the indirect effects. However, the precautionary oil shocks boost
the major oil exporters at the beginning, but generate a severe contraction in
oil importing countries. In the long run, most of the countries, even the oil
exporters, can not escape from this negative indirect impact of oil shocks.
Our findings have clear policy implications in the evaluation of oil impact
on different economies. Overall, we highlight that the total effect of oil price
movement on each economy depends not only on the country type of net
oil exporter or importer, but also on the underlying external international
interdependency structure of them. Further, the underlying source of oil price
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Appendix A
Data of Chapter Two and Three
A.1 List of Countries for Chapter Two
Table A.1: Country List
Industrial Emerging Other Developing Countries
Australia Argentina Bangladesh
Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Cameroon
Canada Brazil Congo, Republic of
Denmark Chile Cote d’Ivoire
Finland China, P.R.: Hong Kong Cyprus
France China, P.R.: Mainland Ghana
Germany Colombia Guyana
Greece Egypt Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iceland India Kenya
Ireland Indonesia Malta
Italy Korea, Republic of Mozambique
Japan Malaysia Nigeria
Netherlands Mexico Pakistan
New Zealand Morocco ROW
Norway Peru Saudi Arabia
Portugal Philippines Senegal





Notes : Country classification is based on the IMF’s definition.
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A.2 Data Sources
Quarterly real GDP series are primarily from the IMFs International Financial
Statistics (IFS) data base with 2010 as the base year. When quarterly series are
not available we extract the annual series for interpolation. If recent annual
series are not available, the IFS series are extended using the growth rates
derived from World Banks World Development Indicators (WDI).
Where quarterly data are not available, we first use the existing data from
the Singapore Centre for Applied and Policy Economics (SCAPE) at the Na-
tional University of Singapore. In that data set, some major Asian quarterly
GDP series are carefully interpolated using the Chow-Lin related series tech-
nique (for further details, see the following section and Abeysinghe and Ra-
jaguru, 2004). We use the same technique to interpolate other GDP series
based on quarterly export series. After collecting or interpolating the quar-
terly data, seasonal adjustment is performed with R (seasonal package), that
uses the U.S. Census X-13ARIMA-SEATS program (For more details, see U.S.
Census Bureau, 2015).
The bilateral export (FOB) series are from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS); quarterly series are in 2010 constant US dollars. In the
DOTS dataset, there are several missing components (Singapore to Indonesia,
1982Q1-2002Q4; Chile to Nigeria, 1982Q1-1991Q1; Ghana to Chile, 1982Q1-
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1986Q1; Zambia- Mexico 1982Q1-1983Q4). For Singapore to Indonesia we use
the corresponding import data of Indonesia from Singapore (Import, CIF). For
the other missing series, we assign zero values because of the relatively weak
trade linkage between these countries. This is corroborated by the recently
available data for these countries. After generating the weight matrix, we take
twelve quarter moving average to smoothen export shares.
The oil price data is crude oil series from IMF primary commodity price
data set. The oil series is monthly nominal price in U.S. dollars. We convert
frequency of the oil series from monthly to quarterly by taking the end of the
period value.
A.3 Interpolation Methodology
The methodology we use stems from Chow and Lin (1971), Fernandez (1981)
and Litterman (1983). The basic idea here is to find some GDP-related quar-
terly series and come up with a predictive equation by running a regression of
annual GDP on annual related series. Then use the quarterly figures of the
related series to predict the quarterly GDP figures and adjust them to match
the annual aggregates.
The fundamental equation for Chow-Lin disaggregation of n annual GDP
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figures to 4n quarterly figures is
yˆ = Xβˆa + V C
′(CV C ′)−1uˆa (A.1)
where
βˆa = [X




1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 ... 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ... 0
. . . . . . . . ... .
0 . . . . . . . ... 1
 (A.3)
Here yˆ is the (4n ∗ 1) vector of disaggregated quarterly GDP figures, ya is the
observed (n ∗ 1) vector of annual GDP figures, X is a (4n ∗ k) matrix of k
predictor variables, V is a (4n∗4n) covariance matrix of quarterly error terms
ut, uˆa = ya − Xaβˆa is an n ∗ 1 vector of residuals from an annual regression
of GDP on predictor variablesXa = CX , C is an (n ∗ 4n) aggregation matrix
and βˆa is a (k ∗ 1) vector of GLS estimates of regression coefficients derived
from an annual regression.
Chow and Lin presented two forms of V . The simpler one is the case where
ut is white noise, in which case V is diagonal and the the GLS estimator reduces
to OLS. In this case the second term on the RHS of (1) amounts to allocating
1/4 of the annual residual to each quarter of the year. The second form is to
assume that ut follows an AR(1) process of the form ut =t−1 +²t, |ρ| < 1 and
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²t ∼ iid(0, σ2² ), in which case V has the well-known form
V = σ2²

1 ρ ρ2 ... ρ4n−1
ρ 1 ρ ... ρ4n−2
. . . ... .
ρ4n−1 . . ... 1
 (A.4)
By extending the monthly-quarterly case considered by Chow and Lin to the
quarterly-annual case we get the following equation that can be used to esti-
mate ρ from the annual estimate ρˆa:
(ρ7 + 2ρ6 + 3ρ5 + 4ρ4 + 3ρ3 + 2ρ2 + ρ)/(2ρ3 + 4ρ2 + 6ρ + 4) = ρˆa (A.5)
A major difficulty with the Chow-Lin procedure, especially in the context of
the GDP regressions of this paper, is the possibility of non-stationary residuals.
To account for this Fernandez (1981) derived (1) and (2) under the assumption
that ρ = 1. This accommodates a regression based on first differences. As a
further generalization Litterman (1983) assumed ut = ut−1 + ²t and ²t =
²t−1+et, e ∼ iid(0, σ2e). By setting initial conditions to zero, Litterman derived




1 0 0 ... 0 0
−1 1 0 ... 0 0
0 −1 1 ... 0 0
. . . ... . .
0 0 0 ... −1 1
 , H =

1 0 0 ... 0 0
−ρ 1 0 ... 0 0
0 −ρ 1 ... 0 0
. . . ... . .
0 0 0 ... −ρ 1
 (A.6)
By extending the monthly-quarterly case considered by Litterman to the
quarterly-annual case we get the following equation to derive an estimate of ρ
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based on ρˆa:
(ρ10 +4ρ9 +10ρ8 +20ρ7 +31ρ6 +40ρ5 +44ρ4 +40ρ3 +32ρ2 +24ρ+10) (A.7)
/(2ρ6 + 8ρ5 + 20ρ4 + 40ρ3 + 62ρ2 + 80ρ + 44) = ρˆa
Note that by setting H = I we revert to the method suggested by Fernan-
dez (1981). By setting D = I we revert to the Chow-Lin method with AR(1)
errors. In this case it is better to replace the first element of H by
√
1− ρ2.
By setting D = H = I we get the Chow-Lin methods with white noise errors.
Given that many economic time series are well characterized as integrated
processes and integration and cointegration are invariant to temporal aggrega-
tion Marcellino (1999), the most recommendable approach to disaggregating
a time series is to find a cointegrating regression and then apply the Chow-Lin
technique with a serial correlation adjustment, if necessary. If a cointegrating
regression is not available then we resort to using the differenced data series.
In this paper, the empirical results are robust to different Chow-Lin related
multivariate interpolation methods listed above. To save the space, we only
report the results based on Chow-Lin procedure with AR(1) error term. Other
results are available upon request.
158
Appendix B
Additional Tables for Chapter
Three
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Table B.1: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price Movements on the G7
Countries and China, Aggregate Demand Shocks
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler
Impact
Total Impact
Canada Short Run 0.19 0.08 0.27
Long Run 0.03 -0.04 -0.01
China Short Run -0.27 0.14 -0.13
Long Run -0.65 0.21 -0.44
France Short Run -0.07 0.23 0.16
Long Run -0.11 0.10 -0.01
Germany Short Run -0.12 0.33 0.20
Long Run -0.20 0.16 -0.04
Italy Short Run 0.17 0.24 0.41
Long Run 0.08 0.10 0.18
Japan Short Run 0.36 0.14 0.50
Long Run 0.12 -0.02 0.10
United Kingdom Short Run -0.09 0.14 0.05
Long Run -0.17 0.07 -0.10
United States Short Run -0.07 0.15 0.08
Long Run -0.11 0.06 -0.06
Table A.1. Impact of Oil Price Movement on the G7 Countries and China, Aggregate Demand Shocks
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20 quarters.
Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table B.2: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price Movements on Major Oil
Exporting Countries, Aggregate Demand Shocks
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler
Impact
Total Impact
Indonisia Short Run 0.29 0.32 0.61
Long Run 0.49 0.06 0.55
Iran Short Run 0.27 0.06 0.33
Long Run 0.75 -0.01 0.74
Malaysia Short Run 0.21 0.42 0.63
Long Run 0.11 0.10 0.21
Mexico Short Run -0.25 0.16 -0.09
Long Run -0.07 -0.02 -0.09
Nigeria Short Run 1.08 0.06 1.14
Long Run 1.53 0.06 1.59
Norway Short Run 0.24 0.06 0.29
Long Run 0.29 -0.01 0.28
Saudi Arabia Short Run 0.63 0.10 0.73
Long Run 0.82 0.06 0.88
Table A.2. Impact of Oil Price Movement on Major Oil Exporters, Aggregate Demand Shocks
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20
quarters.  Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table B.3: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price Movements on the G7
Countries and China, Precautionary Demand Shocks
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler Impact Total Impact
Canada Short Run 0.08 0.01 0.09
Long Run -0.01 -0.43 -0.45
China Short Run -0.30 0.06 -0.24
Long Run -0.74 0.04 -0.70
France Short Run -0.14 0.09 -0.05
Long Run -0.21 -0.17 -0.38
Germany Short Run 0.18 -0.06 0.12
Long Run 0.82 -0.74 0.08
Italy Short Run -0.13 0.14 0.00
Long Run -0.26 -0.22 -0.48
Japan Short Run 0.25 -0.02 0.23
Long Run 0.29 -0.40 -0.12
United Kingdom Short Run -0.29 0.10 -0.19
Long Run -0.47 -0.05 -0.52
United States Short Run -0.23 0.17 -0.06
Long Run -0.60 0.04 -0.56
Table A.3. Impact of Oil Price Movement on the G7 Countries and China, Percautionary Demand Shocks
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20 quarters.
Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table B.4: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price Movements on Major Oil
Exporting Countries, Precautionary Demand Shocks
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler
Impact
Total Impact
Indonisia Short Run 0.26 0.07 0.33
Long Run 0.82 -0.23 0.59
Iran Short Run 0.75 -0.03 0.73
Long Run 0.90 -0.07 0.83
Malaysia Short Run 0.61 -0.11 0.50
Long Run 0.83 -0.53 0.30
Mexico Short Run 0.86 -0.15 0.70
Long Run 0.65 -0.36 0.29
Nigeria Short Run -0.03 -0.38 -0.41
Long Run 0.67 -0.39 0.28
Norway Short Run -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
Long Run -0.08 -0.15 -0.23
Saudi Arabia Short Run 0.74 -0.29 0.45
Long Run 0.88 -0.43 0.45
Table A.4. Impact of Oil Price Movement on Major Oil Exporters, Percautionary Demand Shocks
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20
quarters.  Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table B.5: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price Movements on the G7
Countries and China, Supply Shocks
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler Impact Total Impact
Canada Short Run 0.01 0.00 0.01
Long Run -0.10 0.01 -0.09
China Short Run 0.25 -0.04 0.21
Long Run 0.77 -0.09 0.68
France Short Run 0.01 -0.05 -0.04
Long Run -0.11 -0.18 -0.29
Germany Short Run -0.16 0.00 -0.16
Long Run -0.84 0.11 -0.74
Italy Short Run -0.14 -0.04 -0.18
Long Run -0.05 -0.27 -0.33
Japan Short Run -0.14 0.12 -0.02
Long Run -0.36 0.33 -0.02
United Kingdom Short Run -0.16 -0.03 -0.18
Long Run -0.12 -0.09 -0.21
United States Short Run 0.01 0.01 0.03
Long Run -0.01 0.00 -0.02
Table A.5. Impact of Oil Price Movement on the G7 Countries and China, Supply Shocks
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20 quarters.
Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table B.6: Direct and Indirect Impact of Oil Price Movements on Major Oil
Exporting Countries, Supply Shocks
Direct Impact Indirect Multipler
Impact
Total Impact
Bahrain Short Run -0.14 0.07 -0.08
Long Run -0.05 0.08 0.04
Indonisia Short Run 0.61 0.06 0.66
Long Run 1.07 0.12 1.19
Iran Short Run -0.21 -0.03 -0.24
Long Run 0.05 0.07 0.12
Malaysia Short Run 0.59 0.04 0.62
Long Run 0.58 0.31 0.89
Mexico Short Run 0.05 -0.03 0.02
Long Run -0.33 0.02 -0.31
Nigeria Short Run 0.51 -0.28 0.22
Long Run 0.27 -0.11 0.16
Norway Short Run -0.10 -0.04 -0.15
Long Run 0.03 -0.15 -0.12
Saudi Arabia Short Run 1.04 -0.22 0.82
Long Run 0.44 0.14 0.58
Notes: The table shows the cumulative effect. Short run refers to 4 quarters and long run to 20
quarters.  Results are reported in percentage points.
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